When international sanctions on Iran’s nuclear program were still in place, Chinese businesses found elaborate ways to circumvent them, at least partially. And once the 2015 nuclear agreement—to which China is a party—removed those sanctions, these businesses were in a position to capitalize on the opening of Iranian markets. Now that Washington has withdrawn from the deal and re-imposed sanctions, it seems unlikely that Beijing will want to abide by them. James Dorsey, however, thinks it possible that China will have no choice:
[T]his time around, rejecting and violating U.S. sanctions may prove—for China as well as the other signatories—to be a trickier undertaking. Last time, Beijing and the other [future] signatories [to the nuclear deal] were part of an international consensus that aimed at forcing Tehran to accept restrictions on its nuclear program, even if they at times circumvented the sanctions.
China and the other signatories are now likely to be operating in a far more confrontational environment. The subtext of President Trump’s decision [to withdraw from the deal], as well as the positions taken by Saudi Arabia and Israel, appears to be a policy that seeks to achieve regime change in Tehran. Riyadh and the United Arab Emirates recently suggested that they are willing to . . . sanction those who fail to support them in their eleven-month-old economic and diplomatic boycott of Qatar. There is little reason to doubt that they would do the same in their confrontation with Iran. . . .
In Beijing’s case, its concerted effort to remain above the fray of the Middle East’s multiple conflicts could be severely compromised if it were forced to take sides in a conflict between Iran, a country with which Beijing feels it has much in common and that it has assisted in developing its ballistic and nuclear programs, and Riyadh, a newer friend that is economically important to the People’s Republic. . . .
[Of course, a complication is that] Saudi Arabia desperately needs foreign investment, and China, moreover, is one of Saudi Arabia’s foremost oil-export markets. While the Saudi military remains focused on U.S. and European arms purchases, Beijing—at a time when a military confrontation between the kingdom and Iran is not beyond the realm of the possible—is a source of weaponry the U.S. has been unwilling to sell to Saudis so far.
Read more on BESA Center: https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/china-iran-sanctions/