On May 13, coordinated suicide bombings struck three churches in the Indonesian city of Surabaya; a fourth bombing occurred at the local police station the next day. Islamic State (IS) claimed responsibility for the attacks. To Ilan Berman and James Clad, the incident is indicative of a growing threat to the overwhelmingly Muslim country:

Indonesian Islam has long contained important cultural and ideological barriers to intolerance. . . . Despite variations within the 3,000-mile archipelago, Indonesia’s bedrock culture, especially in Java, reflects and reinforces coexistence among faiths, as well as tolerance for differing worldviews. Since the late 1990s, Indonesia’s democratic institutions have flourished in a diverse milieu in which self-described “Islamic” parties are free to contend. . . .

But is this delicate balance eroding? . . . The past couple of years have indeed offered worrying signs that Islamist groups and ideologies have gained influence. This includes, notably, the rise of Hizb-ut Tahrir Indonesia, a radical group complicit in the political ferment that surrounded last year’s hotly contested gubernatorial elections in Jakarta. The group is now formally banned by President Joko Widodo’s national government. . . .

[A]s of last fall some 700 Indonesians were estimated to have joined the ranks of Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. Those radicalized elements are now returning home, with devastating effect—all of the perpetrators of the Surabaya attacks were “alumni” of IS’s Middle Eastern caliphate. . . .

These trends make Indonesia an inviting target for Islamic State. With its decline in the Middle East, the terrorist group has made Southeast Asia a target of opportunity. Last fall, Islamic militants affiliated with IS waged a pitched but ultimately unsuccessful battle for the southern Philippine city of Marawi. As May’s bloody events in Surabaya make plain, similar radicals have now set their sights on Indonesia as well. Their goals are clear: to undermine the country’s religious moderation and exploit its shifting domestic scene in order to promote their own extreme worldview. And, like elsewhere, their successes will be measured by pluralism’s failure.

Yesterday, the beepers used by hundreds of Hizballah operatives were detonated. Noah Rothman puts this ingenious attack in the context of the overall war between Israel and the Iran-backed terrorist group:

[W]hile the disabling of an untold number of Hizballah operatives is remarkable, it’s also ominous. This week, the Israeli defense minister Yoav Gallant told reporters that the hour is nearing when Israeli forces will have to confront Iran’s cat’s-paw in southern Lebanon directly, in order to return the tens of thousands of Israelis who fled their homes along Lebanon’s border under fire and have not yet been able to return. Today’s operation may be a prelude to the next phase of Israel’s defensive war, a dangerous one in which the IDF will face off against an enemy with tens of thousands of fighters and over 150,000 rockets and missiles trained on Israeli cities.

Seth Frantzman, meanwhile, focuses on the specific damage the pager bombings have likely done to Hizballah:

This will put the men in hospital for a period of time. Some of them can go back to serving Hizballah, but they will not have access to one of their hands. These will most likely be their dominant hand, meaning the hand they’d also use to hold the trigger of a rifle or push the button to launch a missile.

Hizballah has already lost around 450 fighters in its eleven-month confrontation with Israel. This is a significant loss for the group. While Hizballah can replace losses, it doesn’t have an endlessly deep [supply of recruits]. This is not only because it has to invest in training and security ahead of recruitment, but also because it draws its recruits from a narrow spectrum of Lebanese society.

The overall challenge for Hizballah is not just replacing wounded and dead fighters. The group will be challenged to . . . roll out some other way to communicate with its men. The use of pagers may seem archaic, but Hizballah apparently chose to use this system because it assumed the network could not be penetrated. . . . It will also now be concerned about the penetration of its operational security. When groups like Hizballah are in chaos, they are more vulnerable to making mistakes.