Last month, the Kurdish Regional Government in Iraq (KRG) signed a deal with Russia’s state-owned energy company, Rosneft, to extract and export natural gas from its territory. To Anna Borshchevskaya and Bilal Wahab, the deal is evidence that the KRG, losing faith in the U.S., is seeking Russian protection instead. Iraqi Kurds have felt betrayed by Washington since September 2017, when the America allowed Iran-backed militias to crush their bid for independence. Borshchevskaya and Wahab write:

From a purely economic standpoint, Moscow’s decision [to invest in Kurdistan] seems to make little sense, until one considers that Vladimir Putin views energy deals primarily as a foreign-policy tool. . . . [Also], it is important to remember that [Russia’s] relationship with the Kurds goes back about 200 years. Russia understood their importance during the days of Catherine the Great and began acting as their patron—while cynically using them toward its own ends. This pattern is apparently resurfacing with Putin. . . .

Erbil needs to be careful about its choice of bedfellows in the longer term. . . . In Syria, Moscow allowed Turkey to attack Kurdish forces and drive them from Afrin. And in Iraq, Russian energy companies may be using their operations in the KRG as a mere temporary lever to pry better contract terms out of Baghdad. Embracing internationally sanctioned Russian firms also goes against the aspirations of the Kurdish electorate, who have called for better governance and economic reform. More broadly, unlike the United States, Moscow has no regard for rule of law and human rights, so its patronage could be bad news for the Kurdish public.

In Washington, some officials may not consider rapprochement with the KRG to be urgent now that the fight against Islamic State is winding down, especially given Erbil’s decision to ignore U.S. warnings [against holding last year’s] referendum. Yet they should understand that so long as the future U.S. role in the Middle East remains unclear, more local actors will look to Russia as the main alternative for their survival, at potentially great harm to long-term U.S. interests.

Analyzing the recent direct Iranian attack on Israel, and Israel’s security situation more generally, Michael Oren looks to the 2015 agreement to restrain Iran’s nuclear program. That, and President Biden’s efforts to resurrect the deal after Donald Trump left it, are in his view the source of the current crisis:

Of the original motivations for the deal—blocking Iran’s path to the bomb and transforming Iran into a peaceful nation—neither remained. All Biden was left with was the ability to kick the can down the road and to uphold Barack Obama’s singular foreign-policy achievement.

In order to achieve that result, the administration has repeatedly refused to punish Iran for its malign actions:

Historians will survey this inexplicable record and wonder how the United States not only allowed Iran repeatedly to assault its citizens, soldiers, and allies but consistently rewarded it for doing so. They may well conclude that in a desperate effort to avoid getting dragged into a regional Middle Eastern war, the U.S. might well have precipitated one.

While America’s friends in the Middle East, especially Israel, have every reason to feel grateful for the vital assistance they received in intercepting Iran’s missile and drone onslaught, they might also ask what the U.S. can now do differently to deter Iran from further aggression. . . . Tehran will see this weekend’s direct attack on Israel as a victory—their own—for their ability to continue threatening Israel and destabilizing the Middle East with impunity.

Israel, of course, must respond differently. Our target cannot simply be the Iranian proxies that surround our country and that have waged war on us since October 7, but, as the Saudis call it, “the head of the snake.”