In response to the re-imposition of U.S. sanctions on the Islamic Republic, one of the top generals of its Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has threatened to blockade the Strait of Hormuz, which separates the Persian Gulf from the Gulf of Oman, which in turn leads into the Indian Ocean. Ariel Cohen explores the likely consequences should Tehran attempt to do so:

A recent oil-industry analysis shows that if Iran chose to cordon off the [strait], nearly 20 million barrels per day of crude oil—roughly 40 percent of global seaborne oil exports—would stop flowing from the [Persian] Gulf. The IRGC—the country’s premier military branch—has a myriad of options at its disposal to conduct a blockade. . . . Even a porous closure of the strait would prove effective, as global shipping insurers would refuse to protect any ship risking the journey. Iran may also target oil fields in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and other Gulf states, which would mean other producers, including Russia, would have to stand by and fill any deficit in the oil markets.

[Currently] Tehran plays an even more destabilizing role in regional conflicts in the Middle East than North Korea plays in the Asia-Pacific. . . . Iran also stands in violation of international law vis-à-vis its territorial waters. An Iranian law passed in 1993 requires that vessels identify themselves before exercising innocent passage through its shared portion of the Gulf—in violation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Threats of closing the Strait of Hormuz are just the most recent illustration of Iran’s subversive behavior. . . .

Tehran cannot, however, dominate the entire Gulf and it is unable to target traffic with guided weapons without evoking an overwhelming reaction by the U.S. and the UK, which are much more significant naval powers than Iran. Furthermore, . . . if Iran shoots missiles at U.S. forces in the Middle East or those of American allies, . . . President Trump would have to decide whether to eliminate Iran’s aerial defenses, ballistic-missile systems, and air force, as well as its nuclear infrastructure. Plans to do so have been in Pentagon drawers since the hostage crisis in 1979 under Jimmy Carter.

The mullahs would be wise to support the free shipping of oil and the healthy global economy, and not risk a potentially catastrophic confrontation they have no hope to survive.

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.