Since seizing power in 2013, Abdel Fatah el-Sisi has energetically cracked down on the Muslim Brotherhood and on Islamic State-affiliated groups, isolated Hamas, improved relations with Israel and the U.S., and taken steps to improve his country’s dire economic situation. Yet his war on Islamic State’s “Sinai Province” has failed to defeat the group and alienated local Bedouin; he has been ruthless—and sometimes brutal—in crushing internal dissent; he has taken to rigging elections; and most Egyptians can expect only worsening poverty. Eran Lerman, in a thorough study, assesses Sisi’s record and urges Washington not to abandon Cairo but to use its military aid as leverage to encourage political and economic reform as well as a more effective war on terror. As far as Israel is concerned, Lerman writes:

Israel and other regional players in the eastern Mediterranean would be well advised to view Egypt’s continued stability as their top foreign-policy priority. In return, Egypt would benefit from the discreet advice and assistance that allies can offer on such issues as water management, economic liberalization, securing the Sinai, and particularly reining in Cairo’s security services to make it easier for Israel to help Egypt on Capitol Hill. . . .

Egypt’s friends, who won’t be suspected as President Obama had been of harboring pro-Muslim Brotherhood sentiments, [can thus] nudge the regime in the right direction. . . .
To begin with, the government in Jerusalem must maintain close relations with the Egyptian leadership. This alliance can be strengthened by discreetly enhancing cooperation in the military and intelligence spheres. Regarding trade, Israel can take a renewed interest in specific economic incentives. . . . At the same time, Israel should encourage the U.S. Congress to remain fully committed to aiding Egypt and helping it win its internal war on terror. This financial support should include gentle persuasion on the part of senators and congressmen to encourage Egypt’s leadership to reform its economy.

Also, Israeli leaders should engage the Egyptian government in a conversation on ways to [move its country’s] public discourse away from the violently anti-Israel rhetoric that continues to pervade Egyptian society. . . .

[Above all in Sinai], the Egyptian government needs to offer local elements—the tribes—a stake in the outcome [of the war on Islamic State]. Resources now dedicated to the continued acquisition of military hardware, which is irrelevant to Egypt’s genuine security needs, should be diverted. . . . Political repression, which may have once been justified as a necessary evil in the struggle against the Muslim Brotherhood, needs to be reconsidered.

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.