America Shouldn’t Reward Bashar al-Assad’s Brutality with Financial and Diplomatic Support

Aug. 28 2018

In a recent essay in the New York Times, the former president Jimmy Carter urged the U.S. and its European allies to accept the Assad regime’s victory in Syria, begin reopening embassies and restoring diplomatic relations, and devote resources to the country’s “reconstruction.” Washington, Carter adds, should also begin the withdrawal of its troops so that the Syrian dictator can more easily restore his control over the rest of the country. To Frederic Hof, these suggestions are both imprudent and repugnant:

The argument presented by the former president hinges on something he must know will not happen: “the Syrian government must accept the inevitability of reforms and implement confidence-building measures, including the release of detainees and accountability for their treatment.” Asking the Assad regime to reform and build confidence is like counseling a shark to go vegan. And accountability for the torture chambers and the mass murder conducted therein would require Assad and his jailers to present themselves for trial in The Hague. Clearly this will not happen. . . . Indeed, the essay’s author does not even require the release of detainees and accountability as first steps. . . .

There is a school of thought in the American intelligence community that an embassy in Damascus might have enabled cooperation with the Assad regime against Islamic State. Yet Assad’s policy from the beginning of the uprising has been to promote extremist reactions to his misrule in order to dilute and discredit the opposition to him. . . .

[Moreover], who will require that . . . the violently corrupt Assad clan and its entourage will enact reforms, even measures watered-down in advance by a credulous, crawling West? Does one truly expect those who have waged a war of mass homicide against civilians over the past seven-plus years will shift into a reformist mode so that embassies can reopen? . . .

Iran—not mentioned in [Carter’s] essay—can provide near-term financial sustenance to its [Syrian] client, as can Russia. This is not a job for Western taxpayers. . . . [T]o lavish resources and international legitimacy on a regime whose human-rights performance contradicts everything Carter [ostensibly] stands for would only prolong Syria’s agony and do so at the expense of Western taxpayers.

Read more at Atlantic Council

More about: Bashar al-Assad, Jimmy Carter, Politics & Current Affairs, Syrian civil war, U.S. Foreign policy

 

By Destroying Iran’s Nuclear Facilities, Israel Would Solve Many of America’s Middle East Problems

Yesterday I saw an unconfirmed report that the Biden administration has offered Israel a massive arms deal in exchange for a promise not to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities. Even if the report is incorrect, there is plenty of other evidence that the White House has been trying to dissuade Jerusalem from mounting such an attack. The thinking behind this pressure is hard to fathom, as there is little Israel could do that would better serve American interests in the Middle East than putting some distance between the ayatollahs and nuclear weapons. Aaron MacLean explains why this is so, in the context of a broader discussion of strategic priorities in the Middle East and elsewhere:

If the Iran issue were satisfactorily adjusted in the direction of the American interest, the question of Israel’s security would become more manageable overnight. If a network of American partners enjoyed security against state predation, the proactive suppression of militarily less serious threats like Islamic State would be more easily organized—and indeed, such partners would be less vulnerable to the manipulation of powers external to the region.

[The Biden administration’s] commitment to escalation avoidance has had the odd effect of making the security situation in the region look a great deal as it would if America had actually withdrawn [from the Middle East].

Alternatively, we could project competence by effectively backing our Middle East partners in their competitions against their enemies, who are also our enemies, by ensuring a favorable overall balance of power in the region by means of our partnership network, and by preventing Iran from achieving nuclear status—even if it courts escalation with Iran in the shorter run.

Read more at Reagan Institute

More about: Iran nuclear program, Israeli Security, U.S.-Israel relationship