In December, the Iraqi military declared victory over Islamic State (IS), having driven it from Iraq’s cities and deprived it of its territorial base. But the organization is far from broken, still carries out terrorist attacks, and is poised to exploit the same deeply rooted sectarian divides that aided in its early victories. Rafid Jaboori explains:
A big part of the Iraqi military’s success has depended on the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU), an umbrella group of Shiite militias backed by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Unlike the previous groups [of volunteers who fought as part of the Sunni awakening]—a U.S. military initiative to organize local Sunnis against al-Qaeda in Iraq and [its successor organization], IS—local Sunni tribesmen who want to fight IS now do so under the auspices of the PMU. That puts them under the command and influence of the Shiite militias. Islamic State’s attempt to play on this [subordination of Sunnis to Shiites] is meant to tap into the grievances of the poorest and most disenfranchised segments of the Iraqi Sunni community. . . .
The Sunni rejectionist movement is now far weaker than it was after the invasion. Still, Sunni resentment will always constitute the main driver of recruitment for IS. The slow pace—or sometimes complete lack—of reconstruction in the cities that suffered heavy damage in the fight against IS is a hindrance to developing trust between the people and the government. There are also worrying reports on corruption within local government and the security forces . . .
The new pattern of IS operations might indicate that the group has returned to the past tactics of its [early] insurgency in Iraq, but that is not the full picture. Despite the heavy military setbacks, IS remains ambitious. In its propaganda, it aims to build on the legacy of the days when it controlled territory and its fighters occupied cities in Iraq and Syria.
The Iraqi government must address the root causes of IS and the possibility of its making another advance. The government should also not assume that support from the United States, which it frequently calls on, will always be forthcoming. At any rate, military campaigns alone will not be enough to defeat IS unless coupled with genuine normalization measures, reconciliation, and good governance.
Read more on RealClear Defense: https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2018/07/31/is_islamic_state_making_plans_for_a_comeback_in_iraq_113670.html