Younger Saudis See Palestinian Statehood as a Threat

While Saudi Arabia’s King Salman seems to trust his son, Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman, with most policy decisions, the two seem to differ when it comes to the Palestinians: the king’s statements seem much more supportive of their position than the prince’s. This difference, writes Haisam Hassanein, reflects a deeper generational divide in Saudi public opinion. (Free registration required.)

Older Saudis grew up in the 1950s and 1960s during the heyday of Arab nationalism, and its embrace of the Palestinian cause. . . . While the Saudis never fully embraced Arab nationalism, they adopted the Palestinian cause to preempt attacks . . . from their arch-opponents, Arab nationalists. . . . However, the younger generations, characterized and led by Mohammad bin Salman and his close ally Mohamed bin Zayed—the crown prince of Abu Dhabi and the primary driver of the United Arab Emirates’ foreign policy—[don’t share this view]. . . .

[The two princes] realize that Palestinians in general are not . . . supporters of Saudi and Emirati interests with regard to checking the power of political Shiite Islamists, most notably Iran, and Sunni political Islamists, primarily the Muslim Brotherhood. . . . [O]ver the last few years, their position has been increasingly adopted first by younger elites and then more broadly, not least as Saudi Arabia itself has come under missile attack from Iranian proxies. . . .

[T]he younger Gulf generations . . . believe it is [most] likely that a fully independent Palestinian state would itself be hostage to radical forces and would in fact become an extreme source of instability in the region. [Indeed, the two princes] believe that establishing a Palestinian state would mean handing Iran and Sunni political Islamists another Arab capital to control and influence. Iranian influence among Palestinian groups has solidified over the years, and the crown princes’ assessment is that it is irreversible. [They] are not foolish enough to lobby for and fund the establishment of a state that would most certainly be an Iranian client state. . . .

Despite this, many Western policymakers still fantasize about the idea that the Gulf countries could provide money to create and develop a Palestinian state—indeed, this is reportedly one of the founding principles of the Trump-Kushner peace plan. That is never going to happen. Those who actively dictate policy in the Gulf are convinced that every dollar the Saudis give to the Palestinians will ultimately go to Iran. The Saudis and Emirates are likely to promise to provide financial assistance in public, but U.S. policymakers should not believe that they would ever deliver when push really comes to shove.

Read more at Haaretz

More about: Mohammad bin Salman, Palestinian statehood, Politics & Current Affairs, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates

What a Strategic Victory in Gaza Can and Can’t Achieve

On Tuesday, the Israeli defense minister Yoav Gallant met in Washington with Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin. Gallant says that he told the former that only “a decisive victory will bring this war to an end.” Shay Shabtai tries to outline what exactly this would entail, arguing that the IDF can and must attain a “strategic” victory, as opposed to merely a tactical or operational one. Yet even after a such a victory Israelis can’t expect to start beating their rifles into plowshares:

Strategic victory is the removal of the enemy’s ability to pose a military threat in the operational arena for many years to come. . . . This means the Israeli military will continue to fight guerrilla and terrorist operatives in the Strip alongside extensive activity by a local civilian government with an effective police force and international and regional economic and civil backing. This should lead in the coming years to the stabilization of the Gaza Strip without Hamas control over it.

In such a scenario, it will be possible to ensure relative quiet for a decade or more. However, it will not be possible to ensure quiet beyond that, since the absence of a fundamental change in the situation on the ground is likely to lead to a long-term erosion of security quiet and the re-creation of challenges to Israel. This is what happened in the West Bank after a decade of relative quiet, and in relatively stable Iraq after the withdrawal of the United States at the end of 2011.

Read more at BESA Center

More about: Gaza War 2023, Hamas, IDF