Much of the bloodshed that has wracked the Middle East in the past decade has been motivated by intra-Islamic religious differences—most often pitting Shiites against Sunnis, but also Sunnis against Alawites (the ruling religious minority in Syria) and Islamic State against everyone who has not accepted its own particular brand of Sunnism. To Hassan Hassan, this violence has marked the culmination of four decades of sectarian conflict in the Muslim world that began with the Islamic Revolution in Iran in the late 1970 and the subsequent rise of the Salafist-jihadist ideology that motivates al-Qaeda and Islamic State. He now believes this period is coming to an end:

In May, Iraq held its first nonsectarian election since 2003. In contrast to previous elections, public sectarian discourse was noticeably absent. Most of the political blocs campaigned with cross-sectarian slogans. . . . Before the election, it also became common to hear politicians and commentators emphasizing the need to rise above sectarianism and vengefulness in order to stabilize the country. . . .

The rapprochement between Shiite leaders like Moqtada al-Sadr and Iraq’s Sunni neighbors is reinforcing this trend. The cleric—once notorious for his hardline views, his prominent role in Iraq’s post-2003 bloody civil wars, and his [followers’] attacks against American soldiers—visited Riyadh last year. The Saudi foreign minister, Adel al-Jubeir, also visited Baghdad six months earlier. Within Iraq, Sadr is now known for his comparatively moderate political and religious views that emphasize the inclusion and better treatment of Sunnis in Iraq. . . .

Recent changes in Saudi Arabia’s posturing, [meanwhile], might help to close off a major source of the new brand of sectarianism [as well]. Since the rise of the new crown prince, Muhammad bin Salman, Saudi Arabia has taken a different direction. Bin Salman has specifically referred to 1979, [the year the kingdom began exporting its own intolerant brand of Islam and encouraging anti-Shiite sentiment], as a year that changed the kingdom and said that he wanted to shift away from the policies that followed. His rhetoric, as many now recognize, is just that—rhetoric. But some aspects of his policies will have a real, positive impact. . . .

The political situation in the region is still volatile, and there will continue to be a degree of destructive sectarianism. . . . But sectarianism, for now, is at its lowest levels in the 40 years since . . . 1979, and will likely remain low for the foreseeable future. The changes in Saudi Arabia haven’t promoted moderation; they have merely stopped the pumping of sectarian hatred into the region. So now, moderate institutions and individuals have their best chance in decades to shape the future of the Middle East.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.