Since the 2015 nuclear deal did not require Tehran to disclose its prior nuclear work—a standard provision of similar agreements—the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has no way of knowing whether there are secret sites being used to develop nuclear weapons that its inspectors are not being allowed to visit. The agreement therefore based its already inadequate inspections regime on the determinations of U.S. intelligence as well as those made previously by the IAEA itself. But, conclude David Albright, Olli Heinonen, and Andrea Stricker, the documents Israel spirited out of the Islamic Republic show that these determinations were wrong and, furthermore, that Tehran has gone to great lengths to conceal its nuclear research from detection:

The United States incorrectly assessed with high confidence in a 2007 declassified National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that “in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear-weapons program.” Based on the information in the [newly captured Iranian nuclear] archives, Iran’s nuclear-weapons program continued after 2003 in this more limited, dispersed fashion. Moreover, the 2007 NIE also incorrectly asserted that Iran had not re-started its nuclear-weapons program as of mid-2007. . . . However, there is no evidence that the program was ever fully halted, even up to today. . . .

Today, there is only partial implementation of the key verification arrangements in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), [as the nuclear deal is formally known], aimed at limiting Iran’s nuclear-weapons work. . . . Moreover, the IAEA, under its safeguards agreement with Iran, has remained . . . unable to access relevant military sites or personnel associated with potential ongoing or past nuclear-weapons work. . . . This, together with the sunset provisions in the JCPOA, and lack of any credible verification of the status and monitoring of its ballistic- and cruise-missile program, have kept open a pathway for Iran’s nuclear-weapons capability. . . .

The new documentation seized by Israel from the Iranian nuclear archive shows that in mid-2003, Iran was making decisions about how to decentralize and disperse the elements of its nuclear-weaponization program [in order to hide it from both inspectors and foreign intelligence services]. Rather than halting its nuclear weaponization work, Iran was carrying out an elaborate effort to break [its nuclear program] into covert and overt parts, where the overt parts would be centered at research institutes and universities, and any effort that could not be plausibly denied as civilian in nature was left as a covert activity. . . .

A key criterion for whether a program could be considered covert or overt was whether it involved handling of nuclear material leaving traces of radioactive contamination, presumably that which could be detected by international nuclear inspectors or foreign intelligence services. In addition, work was judged on whether it could be explained as a peaceful application, e.g. it allowed Iran to disguise a nuclear-weapons effort as a carefully sculpted civilian nuclear activity or non-nuclear military activity.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.