Since the 2015 nuclear deal did not require Tehran to disclose its prior nuclear work—a standard provision of similar agreements—the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has no way of knowing whether there are secret sites being used to develop nuclear weapons that its inspectors are not being allowed to visit. The agreement therefore based its already inadequate inspections regime on the determinations of U.S. intelligence as well as those made previously by the IAEA itself. But, conclude David Albright, Olli Heinonen, and Andrea Stricker, the documents Israel spirited out of the Islamic Republic show that these determinations were wrong and, furthermore, that Tehran has gone to great lengths to conceal its nuclear research from detection:
The United States incorrectly assessed with high confidence in a 2007 declassified National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that “in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear-weapons program.” Based on the information in the [newly captured Iranian nuclear] archives, Iran’s nuclear-weapons program continued after 2003 in this more limited, dispersed fashion. Moreover, the 2007 NIE also incorrectly asserted that Iran had not re-started its nuclear-weapons program as of mid-2007. . . . However, there is no evidence that the program was ever fully halted, even up to today. . . .
Today, there is only partial implementation of the key verification arrangements in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), [as the nuclear deal is formally known], aimed at limiting Iran’s nuclear-weapons work. . . . Moreover, the IAEA, under its safeguards agreement with Iran, has remained . . . unable to access relevant military sites or personnel associated with potential ongoing or past nuclear-weapons work. . . . This, together with the sunset provisions in the JCPOA, and lack of any credible verification of the status and monitoring of its ballistic- and cruise-missile program, have kept open a pathway for Iran’s nuclear-weapons capability. . . .
The new documentation seized by Israel from the Iranian nuclear archive shows that in mid-2003, Iran was making decisions about how to decentralize and disperse the elements of its nuclear-weaponization program [in order to hide it from both inspectors and foreign intelligence services]. Rather than halting its nuclear weaponization work, Iran was carrying out an elaborate effort to break [its nuclear program] into covert and overt parts, where the overt parts would be centered at research institutes and universities, and any effort that could not be plausibly denied as civilian in nature was left as a covert activity. . . .
A key criterion for whether a program could be considered covert or overt was whether it involved handling of nuclear material leaving traces of radioactive contamination, presumably that which could be detected by international nuclear inspectors or foreign intelligence services. In addition, work was judged on whether it could be explained as a peaceful application, e.g. it allowed Iran to disguise a nuclear-weapons effort as a carefully sculpted civilian nuclear activity or non-nuclear military activity.
Read more on Institute for National Security Studies: http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/breaking-up-and-reorienting-irans-nuclear-weapons-program