In March, Hizballah’s leader Hasan Nasrallah declared in a speech that his group, which effectively controls the Lebanese parliament, would begin to focus on reducing government corruption and enacting financial and monetary reforms. Elisheva Simon explains that this was not mere propaganda but signaled a shift away from the longstanding arrangement whereby the terrorist group left the management of the Lebanese economy to its Sunni allies. She writes:

Nasrallah’s [rhetoric may appeal to] many in Lebanon who complain about the corruption that has spread to all sectors of life, especially in government offices and public administration. Yet, . . . since its inception, Hizballah has been a fundamentally corrupt body that has no loyalty to the state and even undermines its foundations. It is a terrorist organization whose main funding comes from a global trade in drugs and arms; it possesses an arsenal of weapons on par with a country; . . . it is engaged in smuggling by land, sea, and air; it is involved in civil wars (in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen), terrorist activity, and the subversion of regimes throughout the Arab world (Bahrain and Saudi Arabia); and it cooperates with crime and drug rings . . . in order to obtain their political support. . . .

Hizballah’s decision to intervene actively in the management of the economic and monetary sectors is evidently another step in [its evolution] from an Islamic organization that views the country as a corrupt and ruthless entity into an organization partnering fully not only with political institutions but also with the economic system and public administration. . . .

Hizballah’s leadership has [also] come to realize that harsher U.S. sanctions pose a serious threat to the revolutionary regime in Tehran. It will become increasingly difficult for the regime to finance the full spectrum of its revolutionary ambitions, including its many “tentacles” in Lebanon and elsewhere. Hizballah therefore has to focus on securing its own sources of funding and providing employment for its members and followers through ever-deeper engagement in Lebanon’s economic and financial spheres of activity.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.