The Trump administration has set November 4 as the deadline for foreign firms to stop buying oil from the Islamic Republic, after which they may be subject to secondary sanctions from the U.S. While these measures are likely to tighten the noose on Iran’s already-ailing economy, Alireza Nader and Bassam Barabandi argue that the U.S. must combine sanctions with other forms of pressure to reverse Tehran’s influence in the region:
The Assad regime appears on the cusp of victory, with Iran’s position in the Levant seemingly strong and secure. Tens of thousands of Iranian-trained troops roam Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon at will, part of the vast Iranian military structure that doesn’t recognize international borders. Yet, . . . in addition to suffering thousands of casualties, Iran has spent billions protecting the Syrian regime. And it needs to spend billions more in order to rebuild Assad-controlled parts of Syria and maintain its dominant role in the country. . . .
[T]he U.S. should maintain support for some anti-Iranian Syrian forces fighting the Assad regime even if Assad’s defeat is not imminent; Iran may have largely “won” the conflict in Syria, but it should be denied stability in areas occupied by its allies and proxies. The U.S. should divert trade and investment from Assad-held areas, a policy it has already set in motion. [In addition], Washington should figure out how to encourage defections from Iranian-commanded Shiite Afghan, Pakistani, and Arab forces numbering thousands in Syria. Many of these fighters are in Syria not because of religion or ideology, but due to financial hardship and desperation. Alternative sources of revenue may convince many to abandon Iran’s mission and return to their home countries.
Iraq presents another important opportunity for the U.S. to roll back Iranian influence. Baghdad is often presented as a pliant junior partner to Tehran, and while Iran does hold many levers of influence, its ability to manipulate its neighbor is not ironclad. Iran’s main source of leverage is its close ties to Shiite religious parties that hold sway in Baghdad. Washington may think that it has no choice but to share power with Tehran in Iraq given that the majority of Iraqis are Shiite. But the Iraqi Shiites are not monolithic in their views of Iranian influence; powerful political figures such as Muqtada al-Sadr see Iran with suspicion and are willing to work with other domestic and foreign actors to offset Iranian power.
Read more on Weekly Standard: https://www.weeklystandard.com/alireza-nader/washington-can-roll-back-irans-influence-heres-how