Why American Efforts to Train Arab Armies Have Failed, and How They Can Succeed

Since Anwar Sadat moved Egypt into the U.S. orbit, Washington has spent many millions of dollars to train and equip the Egyptian military, which nonetheless fought poorly in the 1991 Gulf War. Similarly, the U.S.-trained Iraqi army was swiftly routed by Islamic State in 2014 and the Saudi-led coalition fighting in Yemen—made up of countries that have likewise received massive military assistance from the U.S. and supported by American advisers—has failed to quell the Houthi rebels there. Kenneth Pollack argues that the U.S. must rethink its approach to supporting its Arab allies:

The fraught civil-military relations of the Arab world mean that many Arab rulers are so frightened of being overthrown by ambitious generals that they purposely hobble the armed forces to keep them weak. Whenever that has happened, it has typically led to poor strategic leadership and communications and, on occasion, poor morale and unit cohesion. . . .

But the most critical factor is that Arab cultural-educational practices conditioned too many of their personnel to remain passive at lower levels of any hierarchy and to manipulate information to avoid blame. In modern combat—where the difference between victory and defeat is often aggressive, innovative junior officers able to react to unforeseen circumstances and take advantage of fleeting opportunities—these tendencies proved devastating time and again. . . .

The U.S. failure to improve Arab militaries wasn’t unique or America’s fault. But the United States should have learned long ago that attempting to make Arab forces a carbon copy of the Marines wasn’t going to work. Instead of Americans trying to force Arab military personnel to do things their way, they should look for ways to help them do what they do somewhat better. They won’t get to U.S. levels of effectiveness that way, but then again, trying to force them to think and act like Americans has not succeeded so far, either, and probably never will.

Read more at Foreign Policy

More about: Anwar Sadat, Arab World, Military history, Persian Gulf War, Politics & Current Affairs, U.S. Foreign policy

Kuwait Should Be the Next Country to Make Peace with Israel

Feb. 13 2025

Like his predecessor, Donald Trump seeks to expand the Abraham Accords to include Saudi Arabia. But there are other Arab nations that might consider taking such a step. Ahmad Charai points to Kuwait—home to the Middle East’s largest U.S. army base and desperately in need of economic reform—as a good candidate. Kuwaitis haven’t forgiven Palestinians for supporting Saddam Hussein during his 1990 invasion, but their country has been more rhetorically hostile to Israel than its Gulf neighbors:

The Abraham Accords have reshaped Middle Eastern diplomacy. . . . Kuwait, however, remains hesitant due to internal political resistance. While full normalization may not be immediately feasible, the United States should encourage Kuwait to take gradual steps toward engagement, emphasizing how participation in regional cooperation does not equate to abandoning its historical positions.

Kuwait could use its influence to push for peace in the Middle East through diplomatic channels opened by engagement rather than isolation. The economic benefits of joining the broader framework of the Abraham Accords are overwhelming. Israel’s leadership in technology, agriculture, and water management presents valuable opportunities for Kuwait to enhance its infrastructure. Trade and investment flows would diversify the economy, providing new markets and business partnerships.

Kuwaiti youth, who are increasingly looking for opportunities beyond the public sector, could benefit from collaboration with advanced industries, fostering job creation and entrepreneurial growth. The UAE and Bahrain have already demonstrated how normalization with Israel can drive economic expansion while maintaining their respective geopolitical identities.

Read more at Jerusalem Strategic Tribune

More about: Abraham Accords, Kuwait