Germany’s Decades-Long Hypocrisy Concerning Iran

The Islamic Republic recently celebrated the 40th anniversary of the revolution that brought it into being. While many Iranians may have felt this nothing to celebrate, the German government—fond though it is of speaking of its commitment to human rights on the international stage—eagerly rushed forward with its congratulations. Michael Rubin comments:

The German president Frank-Walter Steinmeier sent a congratulatory telegram to the Iranian president Hassan Rouhani. Both the state minister of the foreign office Niels Annen and an Iran desk officer attended the celebrations [in Tehran]. The irony, of course, is that [their superior], Foreign Minister Heiko Maas, has said he went into politics “because of Auschwitz” and now celebrates a regime whose official position is to deny the Holocaust occurred and that has repeatedly stated its goal to eradicate the Jewish state. . . .

What explains Germany’s enthusiasm for ties to one of the world’s most murderous regimes? . . . The answer is simple: for German authorities across the political spectrum, human rights are only a tool with which to dress the country’s foreign-policy rhetoric. The German public may care about human rights, but few [members of the German political elite], from the right or from the left, do. For German authorities, the primary goal is commercial benefit. The execution of gays, repression of Jews and other minorities, and terrorism are inconveniences to ignore. . . .

It was the German foreign minister Klaus Kinkel who, in 1992, entered office trumpeting human rights while simultaneously seeking to expand trade with the Islamic Republic. At the time, most European countries stood in solidarity against Iran due to the contract the regime had issued on the life of author Salman Rushdie. By promising to tie trade with a substantive discussion of human rights, Kinkel provided an excuse to return German firms to the Iranian market.

Iranian officials understood they could use Germany to break the Western consensus. . . . By the end of [1992], the European Union endorsed Berlin’s “critical dialogue” which, in theory, would reward Iranian improvements on human rights with greater trade. The cynicism of the move is readily apparent in hindsight: by every possible metric, human rights declined as German trade increased. . . . [L]ess than a year and a half after Kinkel assumed his role, the Iranian government resumed its hostage diplomacy, seizing the Iran-Germany Chamber of Commerce member Gerhard Bachmann.

Read more at Washington Examiner

More about: Germany, Human Rights, Iran, Politics & Current Affairs

What a Strategic Victory in Gaza Can and Can’t Achieve

On Tuesday, the Israeli defense minister Yoav Gallant met in Washington with Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin. Gallant says that he told the former that only “a decisive victory will bring this war to an end.” Shay Shabtai tries to outline what exactly this would entail, arguing that the IDF can and must attain a “strategic” victory, as opposed to merely a tactical or operational one. Yet even after a such a victory Israelis can’t expect to start beating their rifles into plowshares:

Strategic victory is the removal of the enemy’s ability to pose a military threat in the operational arena for many years to come. . . . This means the Israeli military will continue to fight guerrilla and terrorist operatives in the Strip alongside extensive activity by a local civilian government with an effective police force and international and regional economic and civil backing. This should lead in the coming years to the stabilization of the Gaza Strip without Hamas control over it.

In such a scenario, it will be possible to ensure relative quiet for a decade or more. However, it will not be possible to ensure quiet beyond that, since the absence of a fundamental change in the situation on the ground is likely to lead to a long-term erosion of security quiet and the re-creation of challenges to Israel. This is what happened in the West Bank after a decade of relative quiet, and in relatively stable Iraq after the withdrawal of the United States at the end of 2011.

Read more at BESA Center

More about: Gaza War 2023, Hamas, IDF