For decades, Palestinian leaders, egged on by Arab rulers, have rejected every offer to divide the Land of Israel into Jewish and Palestinian states. In a departure from the usual positions found in the Arabic press, note the translators of the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), a few writers have recently criticized such Palestinian intransigence. One, Ahmad al-Tawwab, wrote in Egypt’s state-owned newspaper al-Ahram:

We must reassess the bizarre belief that has prevailed for many years among many Arab politicians and intellectuals, especially Palestinian ones, that time necessarily works in our favor; that, despite Israel’s power and the success of the Zionist enterprise, the natural course of events will eventually lead to the fulfilment of all of the Palestinians’ national demands, and that Israel’s demise is a forgone conclusion because it is an alien crop [planted in Middle Eastern soil]. This outlook is one of the reasons that the Palestinians have repeatedly missed opportunities [to resolve the conflict] on the grounds that [the proposed solutions] did not meet their aspirations—based on the belief that the future would bring better opportunities or even eliminate the problem altogether. . . .

Even more surprisingly, the former Palestinian Authority minister Nabil Amr, a member of the ruling Fatah faction, made a similar point in the UK-based and Saudi-owned Asharq al-Awsat:

Seven decades after the Arabs and Palestinians rejected the [1947 United Nations] partition plan, the question remains of whether they were right or wrong in doing so. There are different answers. Those in favor of an all-or-nothing approach still think that rejecting [the plan] was the right decision. But those who believe in agreements and in the principle of saving what can be saved consider this a bitter mistake that led to losses and no gain. . . . The best proof that the opponents [of the partition plan] were wrong is that, today, [the Palestinians] are demanding less than a quarter [of the territory] that they rejected at the time, and there is no guarantee of attaining even this small territory.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.