While defenders of the 2015 nuclear agreement remain attached to the argument that the gradual tightening of U.S. sanctions on the Islamic Republic will not achieve results, recent reports show that, to the contrary, they’ve already done so. Majid Rafizadeh writes:

The sanctions have . . . imposed significant pressure on the Iranian government to the extent that it is cutting funding to its allies, [proxy] militias, and terror groups. In an unprecedented move, on April 17 the state-controlled Syrian newspaper al-Watan made an astonishing revelation when it reported that Iran had halted its credit line to the Syrian government. This occurred one day after the Iranian foreign minister, Javad Zarif, visited Syria. . . .

Since Donald Trump withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), commonly known as the Iranian nuclear deal, Iran’s oil revenues and exports have been steadily falling. Before the U.S. pulled out of the nuclear deal and began taking a tougher stance toward the ruling clerics of Iran, Iran was exporting more than 2.5 million barrels per day (bpd). Iran’s oil exports have since dropped to approximately 1.1 million bpd, a decline of more than 50 percent.

According to the latest reports, U..S sanctions have also caused Iran to cut funds to its militias in Syria. Iran’s militants are not getting their salaries and benefits, making it extremely difficult for them to continue fighting and destabilizing the region. . . .

Feeling the pressure of sanctions on Iran, Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Iran’s proxy, Hizballah, has also called on his group’s fundraising arm “to provide the opportunity for jihad with money and also to help with this ongoing battle.”

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.