As President Trump and his advisers consider whether to begin withdrawing troops from Afghanistan, Clifford May urges them to see the war there as America’s enemies do: a single theater in a much larger war that began with the fall of the Ottoman empire, if not even earlier:

In 1998, [Osama bin Laden] signed a fatwa on behalf of the “World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders,” proclaiming that killing “Americans and their allies—civilians and military—is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it.” [But] scant attention was paid until a few months later when two American embassies in Africa were bombed. . . .

If our troops are to remain in Afghanistan, they should have a mission that is both clear and achievable, one that strengthens American national security. Transforming Afghanistan into a liberal democracy seems unlikely. Definitively defeating the Taliban may require more resources that can be made available at a time when we have other battles to fight and other adversaries to keep in check.

A third option [would entail] gradually and painstakingly strengthening the ability of the Afghan government to defend itself, and ensure that the country never again is used as a safe haven, training ground, and command center for large-scale international terrorist attacks. . . . If what I’m describing is a mission impossible, the only sensible alternative is to retreat from the battlefield. But in that case we should be honest with ourselves about this slow-motion failure, and learn from it. We should imagine the benefits that will accrue to our enemies globally and plan accordingly. . . .

Afghanistan is a battle in a war that began in the distant past; a war that we’re not yet winning; a war that is likely to go on for years to come. Many Americans and Europeans find the prospect of such an “endless war” intolerable. Our enemies, by contrast, are patient and determined. The advantage this gives them should not be underestimated.

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.