While headlines report escalating tensions between the U.S. and Iran, Amir Taheri sees evidence that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is signaling his readiness to back down in the face of growing economic pressure. To understand why, Taheri argues, one must first understand the ideological forces that shape Tehran’s behavior:

Iran and the U.S. do not have a border problem; they are not fighting over access to natural resources; and they do not seek to snatch market share from one another. Nor are they in conflict over the oppression of one side’s kith-and-kin by the other. The two are not fighting over water resources, access to open seas, or calculations about national security. . . . The reason [for tensions] is that Iran no longer behaves as a nation-state but as a vehicle for an ideology. . . .

I find it hard to imagine the Islamic Republic, under Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s weird leadership, ever sacrificing its ideological pretensions in order to advance the interest of Iran as a state. And, yet although it is hard to imagine, provided that the current level of pressure is maintained both by internal opposition and by its many enemies and adversaries from without, [the regime] may be forced to ponder other options besides destructive defiance. . . .

There are [several] signs that Khamenei may be contemplating what he has called “heroic flexibility.” [Among them] is that the date fixed by the supreme leader for Israel to disappear from the face of the earth has been extended to 2050. . . .

Should one regard all that as good news? Not necessarily. The madness that is Khomeinism has always had its method which includes abject surrender when pressed too hard and brazen aggression when pressure is eased. . . . Contrary to claims by the pro-mullah lobby in Washington, [America’s] choice isn’t between surrender to Khomeminist madness and full-scale invasion of Iran. Only when the threshold of tolerable pain is reached is the supreme leader likely to reconsider his options. We are not there yet.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.