After over four years of fighting, the U.S. and its allies have finally deprived Islamic State (IS) of its territorial base in Syria and Iraq. But the presence of IS offshoots throughout Africa and Asia, and the group’s ability to carry out terrorist attacks—for instance the Easter bombings in Sri Lanka—show that it is far from defeated. Bill Roggio urges Washington to break its habit of prematurely declaring victory and precipitously withdrawing, but instead to press its advantage:

Islamic State’s predecessor, the Islamic State of Iraq, which was really a front for al-Qaeda in Iraq, suffered a major defeat during the U.S. surge from 2006 to 2010. The Islamic State of Iraq controlled vast areas of the country prior to the surge; [it] responded [to its defeat] by going to ground and husbanding its forces. By early 2012, the group was back launching vicious attacks against Iraqi security forces, a prelude to Islamic State’s rampage in 2014. This same cycle has been seen in other theaters against jihadist enemies. . . .

Conditions in Iraq and Syria are ripe for this pattern to repeat itself. [The group’s head], Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and many key leaders remain alive. Thousands if not tens of thousands of IS soldiers are at the ready. The Syrian and Iraqi regimes are ill-equipped to deal with the long-term threat. [Moreover], IS is not the only threat that would be buttressed by a [premature] American withdrawal. . . . Al-Qaeda, which initiated the war on 9/11, has not been “decimated” and is not “on the path to defeat” as President Obama boasted years ago. . . .

[A] lack of commitment by the U.S. will also be taken as a sign of encouragement for state sponsors of terrorism, particularly Pakistan and Iran. Pakistan is arguably responsible for the deaths of more than 2,000 U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan. Without Pakistan’s support of the Taliban, it would not be able to maintain a viable insurgency. Iran has paid no price for backing Shiite militias in Iraq, which are responsible for the deaths of more than 600 U.S. soldiers. Disengagement [from Syria, Iraq, or Afghanistan] will be seen as a green light to use terrorism as a tool of statecraft.

The defeat of IS in Iraq and Syria is a welcome and necessary development in the war, and it was long overdue. But it was merely one battle in this long war. These jihadists remain committed to their cause, despite long odds against them. There is no question that the West possesses the resources and talent to defeat such an enemy. Does it have the will?

Earlier this month, an operative working for, or in conjunction with, Hizballah snuck across the Israel-Lebanese border and planted a sophisticated explosive near the town of Megiddo, which killed a civilian when detonated. On Thursday, another Iranian proxy group launched a drone at a U.S. military base in Syria, killing a contractor and wounding five American soldiers. The former attack appears to be an attempt to change what Israeli officials and analysts call the “rules of the game”: the mutually understood redlines that keep the Jewish state and Hizballah from going to war. Nadav Pollak explains how he believes Jerusalem should respond:

Israel cannot stop at pointing fingers and issuing harsh statements. The Megiddo attack might have caused much more damage given the additional explosives and other weapons the terrorist was carrying; even the lone device detonated at Megiddo could have easily been used to destroy a larger target such as a bus. Moreover, Hizballah’s apparent effort to test (or shift) Jerusalem’s redlines on a dangerous frontier needs to be answered. If [the terrorist group’s leader Hassan] Nasrallah has misjudged Israel, then it is incumbent on Jerusalem to make this clear.

Unfortunately, the days of keeping the north quiet at any cost have passed, especially if Hizballah no longer believes Israel is willing to respond forcefully. The last time the organization perceived Israel to be weak was in 2006, and its resultant cross-border operations (e.g., kidnapping Israeli soldiers) led to a war that proved to be devastating, mostly to Lebanon. If Hizballah tries to challenge Israel again, Israel should be ready to take strong action such as targeting the group’s commanders and headquarters in Lebanon—even if this runs the risk of intense fire exchanges or war.

Relevant preparations for this option should include increased monitoring of Hizballah officials—overtly and covertly—and perhaps even the transfer of some military units to the north. Hizballah needs to know that Israel is no longer shying away from conflict, since this may be the only way of forcing the group to return to the old, accepted rules of the game and step down from the precipice of a war that it does not appear to want.