America Must Not Repeat the Mistake of Letting Islamic State Rebound from an Incomplete Defeat

After over four years of fighting, the U.S. and its allies have finally deprived Islamic State (IS) of its territorial base in Syria and Iraq. But the presence of IS offshoots throughout Africa and Asia, and the group’s ability to carry out terrorist attacks—for instance the Easter bombings in Sri Lanka—show that it is far from defeated. Bill Roggio urges Washington to break its habit of prematurely declaring victory and precipitously withdrawing, but instead to press its advantage:

Islamic State’s predecessor, the Islamic State of Iraq, which was really a front for al-Qaeda in Iraq, suffered a major defeat during the U.S. surge from 2006 to 2010. The Islamic State of Iraq controlled vast areas of the country prior to the surge; [it] responded [to its defeat] by going to ground and husbanding its forces. By early 2012, the group was back launching vicious attacks against Iraqi security forces, a prelude to Islamic State’s rampage in 2014. This same cycle has been seen in other theaters against jihadist enemies. . . .

Conditions in Iraq and Syria are ripe for this pattern to repeat itself. [The group’s head], Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and many key leaders remain alive. Thousands if not tens of thousands of IS soldiers are at the ready. The Syrian and Iraqi regimes are ill-equipped to deal with the long-term threat. [Moreover], IS is not the only threat that would be buttressed by a [premature] American withdrawal. . . . Al-Qaeda, which initiated the war on 9/11, has not been “decimated” and is not “on the path to defeat” as President Obama boasted years ago. . . .

[A] lack of commitment by the U.S. will also be taken as a sign of encouragement for state sponsors of terrorism, particularly Pakistan and Iran. Pakistan is arguably responsible for the deaths of more than 2,000 U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan. Without Pakistan’s support of the Taliban, it would not be able to maintain a viable insurgency. Iran has paid no price for backing Shiite militias in Iraq, which are responsible for the deaths of more than 600 U.S. soldiers. Disengagement [from Syria, Iraq, or Afghanistan] will be seen as a green light to use terrorism as a tool of statecraft.

The defeat of IS in Iraq and Syria is a welcome and necessary development in the war, and it was long overdue. But it was merely one battle in this long war. These jihadists remain committed to their cause, despite long odds against them. There is no question that the West possesses the resources and talent to defeat such an enemy. Does it have the will?

Read more at Washington Examiner

More about: Iran, Iraq, ISIS, Pakistan, U.S. Foreign policy, War on Terror

What a Strategic Victory in Gaza Can and Can’t Achieve

On Tuesday, the Israeli defense minister Yoav Gallant met in Washington with Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin. Gallant says that he told the former that only “a decisive victory will bring this war to an end.” Shay Shabtai tries to outline what exactly this would entail, arguing that the IDF can and must attain a “strategic” victory, as opposed to merely a tactical or operational one. Yet even after a such a victory Israelis can’t expect to start beating their rifles into plowshares:

Strategic victory is the removal of the enemy’s ability to pose a military threat in the operational arena for many years to come. . . . This means the Israeli military will continue to fight guerrilla and terrorist operatives in the Strip alongside extensive activity by a local civilian government with an effective police force and international and regional economic and civil backing. This should lead in the coming years to the stabilization of the Gaza Strip without Hamas control over it.

In such a scenario, it will be possible to ensure relative quiet for a decade or more. However, it will not be possible to ensure quiet beyond that, since the absence of a fundamental change in the situation on the ground is likely to lead to a long-term erosion of security quiet and the re-creation of challenges to Israel. This is what happened in the West Bank after a decade of relative quiet, and in relatively stable Iraq after the withdrawal of the United States at the end of 2011.

Read more at BESA Center

More about: Gaza War 2023, Hamas, IDF