In a March 8 speech, Hizballah’s leader Hassan Nasrallah called on his followers to give more generously to the organization, citing increasing U.S. economic pressure on Iran—Hizballah’s principal patron—as one reason it needs donor support more than ever. Many have taken this and similar statements as evidence that the terrorist group is in dire financial straits. But Tony Badran argues that such an interpretation takes Nasrallah’s words out of context and ignores the realities on the ground:
At the heart of Nasrallah’s much-cited speech was the domestic situation in Lebanon, which is central to Hizballah’s operations and finances. The Lebanese economy is moribund, and international donors are demanding structural reforms from the government in Beirut. . . . Nasrallah’s messaging was not aimed at raising insignificant amounts of small change from the Shiite community to fund Hizballah’s operations. Rather, he was addressing [Lebanese] Shiites as their communal representative in the political system at a moment of economic hardship and uncertainty in Lebanon. . . . [H]is speeches and anecdotes are purposeful rhetoric intended to serve a specific function: promoting total identification between Hizballah and the Shiite community. . . .
Over the past eight years, Hizballah has been involved in military campaigns in four countries, most notably in Syria. In addition, Hizballah has been using Lebanon as an operational headquarters to host, train, and treat militia fighters from the region. To sustain the logistical needs alone of these campaigns, Hizballah’s expenditures had to grow exponentially. While its fighters are still very much actively deployed, in Syria especially, the conditions in all four theaters today have lessened in intensity since the peak of the conflicts, which has allowed Hizballah to decrease or reallocate spendings. . . .
Hizballah is not bankrupt. But have Iranian funds to the group been affected by sanctions on Tehran? The answer is most likely “yes,” but . . . the more critical question is: has Hizballah’s ability to continue to run its operations, both military and nonmilitary, been substantially curtailed at this point in the maximum-pressure campaign? There is no convincing evidence to suggest that anything like that is happening.
Read more on Tablet: https://www.tabletmag.com/jewish-news-and-politics/285612/hezbollah-isnt-broke