Last week, Iran declared that, unless Europe provides it with a $15 billion line of credit to make up for the damage supposedly done to its economy by U.S. sanctions, it will cease to abide by the terms of the 2015 nuclear agreement. On September 8—two days after the threat supposedly went into effect—officials from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) announced that they had discovered traces of uranium at what Israeli intelligence had already revealed was a secret military nuclear facility, only recently destroyed by the regime. The discovery is further evidence that Tehran had been in violation of both the non-proliferation treaty that it signed in 1970 and the 2015 nuclear deal long before its recent threats. Olli Heinonen, a former deputy director of the IAEA, and Tzvi Kahn write:

The United States and Europe would be making a mistake of historic proportions if they surrender to this latest Iranian threat. Instead, they should stand firm and make clear that Iran will receive sanctions relief only if it negotiates a comprehensive new nuclear deal . . . ensuring, in a verifiable manner, that it has abandoned its pursuit of nuclear weapons. Premature concessions would merely incentivize Iran to engage in further nuclear blackmail, thereby undermining the IAEA’s ability to verify the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program.
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In the face of Iran’s defiance, France is negotiating with Tehran—in coordination with other parties to the 2015 agreement—on a $15 billion letter of credit that would enable Iran to receive hard currency, thereby compensating it for the loss of oil sales resulting from U.S. sanctions. At the root of this proposal lies the apparent assumption that Washington’s withdrawal from the nuclear deal—and the consequent economic crisis Iran faces—has spurred an Iranian decision to achieve a nuclear breakout in retaliation.

Thus, by mitigating Iran’s economic woes, the world could supposedly incentivize Iran to return to compliance with the nuclear deal. The truth is more complicated. In reality, Iran’s incremental nuclear violations aim not to start a war, but to project resolve and to weaken U.S. deterrence.

Last week, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) released its quarterly report on the Iranian nuclear program. According to an analysis by the Institute for Science and International Security, the Islamic Republic can now produce enough weapons-grade uranium to manufacture “five nuclear weapons in one month, seven in two months, and a total of eight in three months.” The IAEA also has reason to believe that Tehran has further nuclear capabilities that it has successfully hidden from inspectors. David M. Weinberg is concerned about Washington’s response:

Believe it or not, the Biden administration apparently is once again offering the mullahs of Tehran a sweetheart deal: the release of $10 billion or more in frozen Iranian assets and clemency for Iran’s near-breakout nuclear advances of recent years, in exchange for Iranian release of American hostages and warmed-over pious Iranian pledges to freeze the Shiite atomic-bomb program.

This month, intelligence photos showed Iran again digging tunnels at its Natanz nuclear site—supposedly deep enough to withstand an American or Israeli military strike. This tells us that Iran has something to hide, a clear sign that it has not given up on its quest for a nuclear bomb.

Meanwhile, Antony Blinken today completes a three-day visit to Saudi Arabia, where he is reportedly pressing the kingdom to enter the Abraham Accords. This is no coincidence, for reasons Weinberg explains:

Washington expects Israeli acquiescence in the emerging U.S. surrender to Iran in exchange for a series of other things important to Israel. These include U.S. backing for Israel against escalated Palestinian assaults expected this fall in UN forums, toning down U.S. criticism regarding settlement and security matters (at a time when the IDF is going to have to intensify its anti-terrorist operations in Judea and Samaria), an easing of U.S. pressures on Israel in connection with domestic matters (like judicial reform), a warm Washington visit for Prime Minister Netanyahu (which is not just a political concession but is rather critical to Israel’s overall deterrent posture), and most of all, significant American moves towards reconciliation with Saudi Arabia (which is critical to driving a breakthrough in Israeli-Saudi ties).

[But] even an expensive package of U.S. “concessions” to Saudi Arabia will not truly compensate for U.S. capitulation to Iran (something we know from experience will only embolden the hegemonic ambitions of the mullahs). And this capitulation will make it more difficult for the Saudis to embrace Israel publicly.