In Lebanon, Economic Pressure on Iran Seems to Be Bearing Fruit

As of Tuesday, it has been two months since anti-government protests—aimed at both corruption in general and at Iranian influence via Hizballah in particular—broke out in Lebanon, forcing the resignation of Prime Minister Saad Hariri. The protests have come amidst tightening U.S. sanctions on Iran and Hizballah, including targeted measures against individuals who launder money for the latter., which Hanin Ghaddar believes that these measures have put the Shiite terrorist group in a difficult position:

[Recently], the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned three more Hizballah financiers, [including the] Lebanon-based accountant Tony Saab. . . . Notably, Saab is a Christian who recently told Lebanese media that he admires Foreign Minister Gebran Bassil, head of a Hizballah-allied Christian-majority party. . . .

[Meanwhile] Lebanon’s political class has come to several important realizations that may alter their actions going forward. First, the international community, [including France], has firmly sided with the protestors and will not provide financial assistance if the establishment refuses to reform. Second, U.S. sanctions may expand to include Christian allies of Hizballah. Third, the United States will not endorse Bassil’s role in any new government.

Hizballah seems to have recognized that it will have to try to maintain control of the government without Bassil’s party, which puts it in a bind. And this is only the beginning of its problems:

Dropping Bassil will isolate [Hizballah] from the Lebanese Christian community—a major compromise that shows it is under tremendous pressure and may be squeezed into further concessions. Continued U.S. sanctions on Hizballah’s main patron, Iran, have amplified the group’s own financial crisis. The Lebanese state is on the verge of economic collapse and possible bankruptcy, preventing Hizballah from making full use of it as an alternative resource. . . .

The group’s violence against protestors and insistence on protecting corrupt politicians have led many citizens to lose faith in its supposed role as the defender of Lebanon and the enemy of injustice. Even Shiite citizens are joining the rest of the country in mass protests, threatening the group’s ability to win seats in parliament and access state institutions.

Now, writes Ghaddar, is the time for Washington to tighten the economic noose even further.

Read more at Washington Institute for Near East Policy

More about: Hizballah, Iran sanctions, Lebanon, U.S. Foreign policy

What a Strategic Victory in Gaza Can and Can’t Achieve

On Tuesday, the Israeli defense minister Yoav Gallant met in Washington with Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin. Gallant says that he told the former that only “a decisive victory will bring this war to an end.” Shay Shabtai tries to outline what exactly this would entail, arguing that the IDF can and must attain a “strategic” victory, as opposed to merely a tactical or operational one. Yet even after a such a victory Israelis can’t expect to start beating their rifles into plowshares:

Strategic victory is the removal of the enemy’s ability to pose a military threat in the operational arena for many years to come. . . . This means the Israeli military will continue to fight guerrilla and terrorist operatives in the Strip alongside extensive activity by a local civilian government with an effective police force and international and regional economic and civil backing. This should lead in the coming years to the stabilization of the Gaza Strip without Hamas control over it.

In such a scenario, it will be possible to ensure relative quiet for a decade or more. However, it will not be possible to ensure quiet beyond that, since the absence of a fundamental change in the situation on the ground is likely to lead to a long-term erosion of security quiet and the re-creation of challenges to Israel. This is what happened in the West Bank after a decade of relative quiet, and in relatively stable Iraq after the withdrawal of the United States at the end of 2011.

Read more at BESA Center

More about: Gaza War 2023, Hamas, IDF