The Anti-Defamation League (ADL) has released a two-part report on the online postings—under a variety of aliases and on several sites—of David Anderson, one of the two perpetrators of the deadly attack on a kosher grocery store in Jersey City. Emerging from these postings is an amalgam of ideas about Jews and the Bible shaped by Black Hebrew Israelite groups and the Nation of Islam—groups Anderson nonetheless rejected as insufficiently extreme—and the fringes of the far-right and far-left. In Anderson’s view, African Americans are descendants of the biblical Jews, today’s Jews are evil impostors, and the former must fight the latter:

The Facebook profile features images of Anderson and hundreds of posts that give evidence of his extreme ideology, including rabid anti-Semitism and hatred of police and white people. There is a distinct and undeniable pattern of virulent rhetoric that indicates deep hostility and a propensity for violence toward his purported enemies—Jewish people. . . .

Numerous posts in this Facebook account illustrate Anderson’s hatred for Jews, whom he sometimes refers to as Khazars—a reference to an anti-Semitic conspiracy theory that modern Jews are descendants of an East European tribe from the 11th century. In July 2015 he wrote, “Brooklyn is full of NAZIS – ASHKE-NAZIS (KHAZARS). He went on to allege that Jews were responsible for murdering black men because “the police are their hand now.”

The last point is an apparent reference to the canard, propagated by various anti-Israel groups, that American police are trained in brutality by Israeli police—and thus the Jewish state, and American Jewish organizations, bear responsibility for the incidents that sparked the Black Lives Matter movement. The report adds:

In September 2015, Anderson reposted an image which attacked “Jewish businessmen” for allegedly siphoning money out of the black community. . . . Anderson also believed that Jews created the state of Israel “as an attempt to make us believe that they were the Jews (us) that the Bible speaks of and their exodus from Auschwitz was our exodus from captivity.”

The first part of the report can be read here,and the more detailed second part at the link below.

On Monday night, the IDF struck a group of Hamas operatives near the Nasser hospital in Khan Yunis, the main city in southern Gaza. The very fact of this attack was reassuring, as it suggested that the release of Edan Alexander didn’t come with restraints on Israeli military activity. Then, yesterday afternoon, Israeli jets carried out another, larger attack on Khan Yunis, hitting a site where it believed Mohammad Sinwar, the head of Hamas in Gaza, to be hiding. The IDF has not yet confirmed that he was present. There is some hope that the death of Sinwar—who replaced his older brother Yahya after he was killed last year—could have a debilitating effect on Hamas.

Meanwhile, Donald Trump is visiting the Persian Gulf, and it’s unclear how his diplomatic efforts there will affect Israel, its war with Hamas, and Iran. For its part, Jerusalem has committed to resume full-scale operations in Gaza after President Trump returns to the U.S. But, Gabi Simoni and Erez Winner explain, Israel does not have unlimited time to defeat Hamas:

Israel faces persistent security challenges across multiple fronts—Iran, the West Bank, Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon—all demanding significant military resources, especially during periods of escalation. . . . Failing to achieve a decisive victory not only prolongs the conflict but also drains national resources and threatens Israel’s ability to obtain its strategic goals.

Only a swift, forceful military campaign can achieve the war’s objectives: securing the hostages’ release, ensuring Israeli citizens’ safety, and preventing future kidnappings. Avoiding such action won’t just prolong the suffering of the hostages and deepen public uncertainty—it will also drain national resources and weaken Israel’s standing in the region and beyond.

We recommend launching an intense military operation in Gaza without delay, with clear, measurable objectives—crippling Hamas’s military and governance capabilities and securing the release of hostages. Such a campaign should combine military pressure with indirect negotiations, maximizing the chances of a successful outcome while minimizing risks.

Crucially, the operation must be closely coordinated with the United States and moderate Arab states to reduce international pressure and preserve the gains of regional alliances.