On January 8, in response to the American airstrikes that killed Qassem Suleimani, the commander of the Islamic Republic’s forces abroad, Tehran launched 22 missiles at two military instillations in Iraq, causing neither Iraqi nor American casualties. Jonathan Spyer notes that, from the ayatollahs’ perspective, an appropriate act of vengeance would have involved the killing of a U.S. figure of similar prominence to Suleimani, or, failing that, a considerable number of more junior personnel. Yet they chose not to attempt such an attack:

Iran has both assets and an ample “target bank” in the local area for the carrying out of such an attack. . . . The problem was not military or logistical in nature, [however]. It was political and strategic. An attack of sufficient magnitude to settle the account over Suleimani would almost certainly be one that would invite further, wider American retribution, and begin the descent to a direct clash between the U.S. and Iran, which Iran could not possibly win, and which could potentially mean the destruction of much that Iran has gained in the region over the last decade. Iran thus had to choose between facing destruction or accepting a somewhat humiliating outcome.

[T]he attacks of January 8 appear to have been formulated and carried out in order to produce precisely the result that they did—namely, a large amount of noise and smoke, so as to enable Tehran to claim that it had taken retribution for the death of Suleimani. And no U.S. casualties, so that Iran could avoid the escalation that these would have made inevitable.

Of course, Iranian efforts to expel the U.S. from Iraq will continue. The Iranian calculus at this point may well have included the assumption that the current administration wants out of the Middle East, and therefore should not be provoked into staying. . . . But the latest round of hostilities indicates that those who helm the Iranian bid for regional hegemony are aware of their drastic limitations in the military arena, are not suicidal, and are capable of formulating and implementing policy in line with the prevailing realities.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.