Last week, an American drone strike killed Qassem Suleimani, who for over two decades led Iran’s Quds Force—which of late has been fighting wars in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen—and managed a network of proxy militias and terrorist groups throughout the Middle East. Among Suleimani’s accomplishments are the transformation of Hizballah into a military powerhouse and the creation of guerrilla forces that have killed hundreds of Americans in Iraq, and many more Iraqis. President Trump had until now refrained from responding militarily to the Quds Force’s multiple attacks on American allies and even military hardware throughout the region since he came to office. But the killing of a U.S. contractor changed the equation.

Joining a number of other Israeli experts in commenting on the significance of Suleimani’s death, Hillel Frisch explains why it is more than a merely tactical success:

Suleimani’s death is a major blow to Iran. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s designation of Esmail Ghaani, Suleimani’s second-in-command, as his successor as head of the Quds Force is an indicator of the magnitude of that blow. Ghaani is in his sixties (as was Suleimani)—not the ideal age to take over a major undercover organization with tentacles throughout much of the Middle East and beyond.

Over twenty years ago . . . a younger, more vibrant Islamic revolutionary leadership chose then-forty-year-old Suleimani over his superiors to head the elite [Quds Force]. Khamenei is older now, and less willing to take the risk of choosing a daring young commander, but that is not the only reason why he did not do so.

Even if the ayatollah were inclined to select a younger replacement, the targeting of Soleimani prevents him from making such a choice. The killing proves beyond doubt that the Iranian security system is riddled with informants. . . . The killing of Soleimani was, [moreover, a meaningful] show of American force because he was touted by Iran as invincible.

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.