With Syrian forces advancing this month into the northwestern province of Idlib—the last major rebel stronghold—it seems that the civil war may finally be nearing an end. But, argues Jennifer Cafarella, the truth is much messier: Damascus has made these recent gains only after a grueling ten-month offensive, and Turkey has now poured thousands of troops into the area, some of whom have already clashed with the Syrian army. Bashar al-Assad’s previous victories, meanwhile, may yet prove Pyrrhic:

Damascus and its [Iranian and Russian] partners gambled that by stretching a thin layer of control over as much terrain as possible, they could convince the international community to accept a regime “victory.” . . . The fragility of the regime’s control is increasingly apparent, [however]. In the southern province of Daraa, where Syria’s original 2011 revolution was born, a new uprising has begun. Sustained protests have sent a clear message that Assad has failed to break his opponents’ will. Insurgents have resumed attacking positions held by Assad, Iran, and Russia at levels approaching those of 2011.

For the first time in years, the attacks have spread to the Syrian capital in Damascus and to parts of the surrounding . . . region. Meanwhile, Islamic State (IS) . . . and al-Qaeda are well positioned to exploit Bashar al-Assad’s weaknesses. IS is already surging in regime-held Syria and expanding its campaign in Kurdish-held areas. . . . Al-Qaeda will remain a powerful insurgency even if Idlib falls.

While the persistence of these terrorist groups also poses a danger to the U.S. interests, Cafarella argues that the persistent vulnerability of Bashar al-Assad and his allies gives Washington an opportunity to advance its strategic interests at minimal cost:

The United States does not need a massive military force in Syria to shape the war’s trajectory, but its current presence is insufficient. U.S. troops continue to help Kurdish forces to disrupt IS networks and . . . to disrupt al-Qaeda attack cells. But current troop levels won’t be enough to defeat the IS insurgency or reverse al-Qaeda’s rise in Syria, much less accomplish wider goals such as stabilizing the Kurdish-dominated northeast or supporting Turkish efforts to contain the humanitarian crisis in the northwest.

The U.S. troops that were redeployed to Iraq should be returned to Syria’s northeastern region. Turkey’s efforts to repel Assad’s forces and protect civilians in northwestern Syria deserve American support. But U.S. efforts are best concentrated in the northeast, [which] has a relatively strong economy compared with economic conditions in regime-controlled areas, and focused investment will help establish it as a model of safety, prosperity, and good governance—a credible alternative to Assad that could help pave the way for a political transition. The United States has a real opportunity to change the course of the brutal Syrian war and, potentially, to shape its endgame.

While I’ve seen much speculation—some reasonable and well informed, some quite the opposite—about why Jerusalem chose Friday morning to begin its campaign against Iran, the most obvious explanation seems to be the most convincing. First, 60 days had passed since President Trump warned that Tehran had 60 days to reach an agreement with the U.S. over its nuclear program. Second, Israeli intelligence was convinced that Iran was too close to developing nuclear weapons to delay military action any longer. Edward Luttwak explains why Israel was wise to attack:

Iran was adding more and more centrifuges in increasingly vast facilities at enormous expense, which made no sense at all if the aim was to generate energy. . . . It might be hoped that Israel’s own nuclear weapons could deter an Iranian nuclear attack against its own territory. But a nuclear Iran would dominate the entire Middle East, including Egypt, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain, with which Israel has full diplomatic relations, as well as Saudi Arabia with which Israel hopes to have full relations in the near future.

Luttwak also considers the military feats the IDF and Mossad have accomplished in the past few days:

To reach all [its] targets, Israel had to deal with the range-payload problem that its air force first overcame in 1967, when it destroyed the air forces of three Arab states in a single day. . . . This time, too, impossible solutions were found for the range problem, including the use of 65-year-old airliners converted into tankers (Boeing is years later in delivering its own). To be able to use its short-range F-16s, Israel developed the “Rampage” air-launched missile, which flies upward on a ballistic trajectory, gaining range by gliding down to the target. That should make accuracy impossible—but once again, Israeli developers overcame the odds.