With Syrian forces advancing this month into the northwestern province of Idlib—the last major rebel stronghold—it seems that the civil war may finally be nearing an end. But, argues Jennifer Cafarella, the truth is much messier: Damascus has made these recent gains only after a grueling ten-month offensive, and Turkey has now poured thousands of troops into the area, some of whom have already clashed with the Syrian army. Bashar al-Assad’s previous victories, meanwhile, may yet prove Pyrrhic:

Damascus and its [Iranian and Russian] partners gambled that by stretching a thin layer of control over as much terrain as possible, they could convince the international community to accept a regime “victory.” . . . The fragility of the regime’s control is increasingly apparent, [however]. In the southern province of Daraa, where Syria’s original 2011 revolution was born, a new uprising has begun. Sustained protests have sent a clear message that Assad has failed to break his opponents’ will. Insurgents have resumed attacking positions held by Assad, Iran, and Russia at levels approaching those of 2011.

For the first time in years, the attacks have spread to the Syrian capital in Damascus and to parts of the surrounding . . . region. Meanwhile, Islamic State (IS) . . . and al-Qaeda are well positioned to exploit Bashar al-Assad’s weaknesses. IS is already surging in regime-held Syria and expanding its campaign in Kurdish-held areas. . . . Al-Qaeda will remain a powerful insurgency even if Idlib falls.

While the persistence of these terrorist groups also poses a danger to the U.S. interests, Cafarella argues that the persistent vulnerability of Bashar al-Assad and his allies gives Washington an opportunity to advance its strategic interests at minimal cost:

The United States does not need a massive military force in Syria to shape the war’s trajectory, but its current presence is insufficient. U.S. troops continue to help Kurdish forces to disrupt IS networks and . . . to disrupt al-Qaeda attack cells. But current troop levels won’t be enough to defeat the IS insurgency or reverse al-Qaeda’s rise in Syria, much less accomplish wider goals such as stabilizing the Kurdish-dominated northeast or supporting Turkish efforts to contain the humanitarian crisis in the northwest.

The U.S. troops that were redeployed to Iraq should be returned to Syria’s northeastern region. Turkey’s efforts to repel Assad’s forces and protect civilians in northwestern Syria deserve American support. But U.S. efforts are best concentrated in the northeast, [which] has a relatively strong economy compared with economic conditions in regime-controlled areas, and focused investment will help establish it as a model of safety, prosperity, and good governance—a credible alternative to Assad that could help pave the way for a political transition. The United States has a real opportunity to change the course of the brutal Syrian war and, potentially, to shape its endgame.

Below, today’s newsletter will return to some other reflections on the one-year anniversary of the outbreak of the current war, but first something must be said of its recent progress. Israel has kept up its aerial and ground assault on Hizballah, and may have already killed the successor to Hassan Nasrallah, the longtime leader it eliminated less than two weeks ago. Matthew Levitt assesses the current state of the Lebanon-based terrorist group, which, in his view, is now “a shadow of its former self.” Indeed, he adds,

it is no exaggeration to say that the Hizballah of two weeks ago no longer exists. And since Hizballah was the backbone of Iran’s network of militant proxies, its so-called axis of resistance, Iran’s strategy of arming and deploying proxy groups throughout the region is suddenly at risk as well.

Hizballah’s attacks put increasing pressure on Israel, as intended, only that pressure did not lead Israelis to stop targeting Hamas so much as it chipped away at Israel’s fears about the cost of military action to address the military threats posed by Hizballah.

At the same time, Levitt explains, Hizballah still poses a serious threat, as it demonstrated last night when its missiles struck Haifa and Tiberias, injuring at least two people:

Hizballah still maintains an arsenal of rockets and a cadre of several thousand fighters. It will continue to pose potent military threats for Israel, Lebanon, and the wider region.

How will the group seek to avenge Nasrallah’s death amid these military setbacks? Hizballah is likely to resort to acts of international terrorism, which are overseen by one of the few elements of the group that has not yet lost key leaders.

But the true measure of whether the group will be able to reconstitute itself, even over many years, is whether Iran can restock Hizballah’s sophisticated arsenal. Tehran’s network of proxy groups—from Hizballah to Hamas to the Houthis—is only as dangerous as it is today because of Iran’s provision of weapons and money. Whatever Hizballah does next, Western governments must prioritize cutting off Tehran’s ability to arm and fund its proxies.