While Turkey has given quiet support to various forces opposed to Bashar al-Assad since the civil war broke out in Syria in 2011, last week was the first time Turkish and Syrian troops fought each other directly—with exchanges of fire leaving soldiers on both sides dead. Jonathan Spyer considers whether the confrontation between the two will escalate, and how Russia will respond:

It is undoubtedly the case that the Syrian regime’s attack on Turkish personnel is a blow to Russian diplomacy. Since emerging as the key diplomatic arbiter in Syria following its entrance into the conflict in September 2015, Russia has sought to maintain cordial relations with a variety of warring sides: Israel and Iran, Turkey and the [Kurdish] PKK militia, Turkey and the Syrian government.

[But the recent clashes] need not mean the general collapse of Russian mediation and diplomacy. Israel has killed Iranian personnel [in Syria] on numerous occasions during its air raids over the last three years, [despite the presence of] Russian air defenses . . . on Syrian soil. [Likewise], the Syrian Kurds have been severely let down by Moscow on a number of occasions, as a result of the Russian strategic goal of inducing Turkey away from its alliance with the United States.

Yet these undoubted Russian betrayals did not result in a wholesale turning away from Moscow on the part of either the Iranians or the Syrian Kurds. On the contrary, both these forces need their relationship with Russia to provide at least a part of what they want. Without the presence of Russia, Israel’s actions against Iran in Syria would likely be far more intense. Russia, meanwhile, prevented a catastrophic [Turkish attack on Kurds] on a larger scale.

Russia, because of the U.S. decision to avoid major engagement in the Syrian war, has emerged both as the decisive military factor and consequently as the main diplomatic force in the country. Since everyone needs it to get anything done, and since there is no alternative patron available, Moscow remains the indispensable partner for all.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.