At a rally last week for the senator and presidential candidate Bernie Sanders, a man unfurled a flag bearing a swastika and began shouting anti-Semitic slurs, in what was unmistakably an attack targeted at the first Jew to be a serious contender for the presidential nomination of a major American political party. None of that, writes, Jonathan Tobin, changes the fact that Sanders has cultivated a coterie of anti-Semitic supporters, advisers, and surrogates, not limited to Congresswomen Rashida Tlaib and Ilhan Omar:

[Senator Sanders’s] campaign manager Faiz Shakir is, [like the two congresswomen, a] supporter of the movement to boycott, divest from, and sanction Israel (BDS). Given that Sanders often says that he is a supporter of Israel, but merely a critic of its government, it’s hard to understand why he would give such a senior position to someone clearly opposed to Israel’s existence.

Recently, the Sanders campaign also hired Phillip Agnew, another virulent BDS backer who has engaged in repeated slanders of Israel and who is a promoter of a school curriculum that calls for the Jewish state’s elimination and that supports terrorist groups seeking to make that nightmare a reality.

The former Women’s March leader and Palestinian-American activist Linda Sarsour is also a Sanders campaign surrogate, despite her long history of anti-Semitic utterances and her willingness to make common cause with supporters of the hatemonger and Nation of Islam leader Louis Farrakhan. Another Sanders surrogate is Amer Zahr, a BDS supporter who has engaged in repeated slurs of Jews and Israel.

Bernie Sanders doesn’t seem capable of [denouncing anti-Semitism when it comes from the political left]. Even worse, he provides cover to Jew-haters who can boast they are advocating for the election of a Jewish president even as they engage in anti-Semitic hate and work for Israel’s destruction.

On Monday night, the IDF struck a group of Hamas operatives near the Nasser hospital in Khan Yunis, the main city in southern Gaza. The very fact of this attack was reassuring, as it suggested that the release of Edan Alexander didn’t come with restraints on Israeli military activity. Then, yesterday afternoon, Israeli jets carried out another, larger attack on Khan Yunis, hitting a site where it believed Mohammad Sinwar, the head of Hamas in Gaza, to be hiding. The IDF has not yet confirmed that he was present. There is some hope that the death of Sinwar—who replaced his older brother Yahya after he was killed last year—could have a debilitating effect on Hamas.

Meanwhile, Donald Trump is visiting the Persian Gulf, and it’s unclear how his diplomatic efforts there will affect Israel, its war with Hamas, and Iran. For its part, Jerusalem has committed to resume full-scale operations in Gaza after President Trump returns to the U.S. But, Gabi Simoni and Erez Winner explain, Israel does not have unlimited time to defeat Hamas:

Israel faces persistent security challenges across multiple fronts—Iran, the West Bank, Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon—all demanding significant military resources, especially during periods of escalation. . . . Failing to achieve a decisive victory not only prolongs the conflict but also drains national resources and threatens Israel’s ability to obtain its strategic goals.

Only a swift, forceful military campaign can achieve the war’s objectives: securing the hostages’ release, ensuring Israeli citizens’ safety, and preventing future kidnappings. Avoiding such action won’t just prolong the suffering of the hostages and deepen public uncertainty—it will also drain national resources and weaken Israel’s standing in the region and beyond.

We recommend launching an intense military operation in Gaza without delay, with clear, measurable objectives—crippling Hamas’s military and governance capabilities and securing the release of hostages. Such a campaign should combine military pressure with indirect negotiations, maximizing the chances of a successful outcome while minimizing risks.

Crucially, the operation must be closely coordinated with the United States and moderate Arab states to reduce international pressure and preserve the gains of regional alliances.