According to data released last week, the Islamic Republic has had over 10,000 reported cases of coronavirus—more in absolute numbers than any country save China and Italy. Official statistics likely downplay the numbers, and there are credible if unconfirmed reports of mass graves being dug for the disease’s victims. Mehdi Khalaji examines the consequences:

The epidemic hit Iran . . . just after two major domestic crises—the gasoline protest movement that began in November, and the military’s downing of an airliner full of Iranian citizens in January—and just before the February parliamentary election. Moreover, ground zero was Qom, the ideological capital and spiritual center for Shiite Muslims worldwide—including many potential disease carriers from China.

In addition to fostering a general climate of instability, the [prior] crises made much of the Iranian public instantly suspicious toward the government’s statements, statistics, and containment strategies in reaction to the virus. . . . One practical consequence of such mistrust is that citizens are now ignoring the recommendations issued by the political and religious establishment as much as they can, instead listening to their own instincts or consulting alternative sources.

The dangerously irresponsible decisions that authorities have made about preventive measures in Qom provide a window into the regime’s religiously superstitious orientation. Both Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the clerical establishment he controls have opposed the medical recommendations given to them by the Ministry of Health, including calls for setting up quarantines in Qom. They tend to justify their resistance by touting the city’s divine immunity, even going so far as to encourage people to visit the local shrine of Fatima Masoumeh and pray for the sick to receive miraculous cures.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.