In the past several years, Tehran has transformed Lebanon, Syria, and the Houthi-dominated parts of Yemen into client states, and has come close to doing the same with Iraq. Meanwhile, Tajikistan, which in 2015 began to grow close to Saudi Arabia and has carried out a massive crackdown on the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood has now also showed signs of reverting to the Iranian sphere of influence. James Dorsey writes:
Driving the patching up of differences [between Tehran and Dushanbe] is the fact that landlocked Tajikistan, like its neighbor Uzbekistan, needs access to Iranian ports, including the Indian-backed one in Chabahar at the top of the Arabian Sea, which offer the cheapest and shortest transportation options. Iran’s attractiveness to Central Asian nations increases the Islamic Republic’s importance to the Belt and Road Initiative, China’s infrastructure-, transportation-, and energy-driven plan to connect the Eurasian landmass to Beijing.
In nearby Uzbekistan, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev has been slowly moving his country into the Iranian orbit as well:
Already a vital node for Uzbek exports and imports, Iran is written all over Mirziyoyev’s new transportation-infrastructure plans. A decree issued in late 2017 identified Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan-Iran-Oman, China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan, and three trans-Afghan corridors as key to the . . . Uzbek plans [that] envision extending [a] rail line being extended to the Afghan city of Herat, from where it would branch out to the Iranian ports of Bandar Abbas, Chabahar, and Bazargan.
Thus, despite U.S. sanctions, Iran may be outmaneuvering Saudi Arabia in the contest for influence in these Muslim-majority countries.
Read more on BESA Center: https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/iran-central-asia/