Since its founding, the Islamic Republic has sought to expand its influence throughout the Middle East by cultivating alliances with Shiite communities in Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, and elsewhere—a strategy that has allowed it to dominate the politics of these countries. Yet, writes Hanin Ghaddar, recent anti-corruption protests in Iraq and Lebanon show that the very Shiite populations Tehran has been cultivating are turning against it:

In Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq, and inside Iran . . . the people have realized that the enemy is within. It’s their own governments that have allowed the Iranian regime to take over the state and its institutions. The ideologies, “resistance” [i.e., anti-Israel] rhetoric, sectarian identities, and conspiracy theories that have shaped the collective identities and views of the Shiite communities across the region are slowly but surely disintegrating and are being replaced with economic concerns, a yearning for [democratic] citizenship, and stronger national [rather than sectarian] identities.

[I]n order to gain access to state institutions [in these countries], Iran built alliances with local political figures and parties. . . . For Iran, it has always been easiest to build these alliances with corrupt politicians, either by buying them off directly or by promising them positions through which they can gain access to the state’s resources.

So far, Iran and its proxies have managed to repress demonstrations through brute force, but, Ghaddar writes, the results of such repression are bound to be temporary. As for the possibility that Iran might start a war to distract from its problems—most likely by using Hizballah to attack Israel—Ghaddar argues that this is unlikely:

There are three main reasons why Hizballah can’t start a war with Israel at this point. First, they do not have the money to fund a war, train fighters, and hire new ones. Second, they cannot guarantee [that the West will provide funds for postwar] reconstruction as in 2006 when a pro-Western [government] was in power. Third, the Lebanese Shiite community doesn’t want a new war with Israel—due to the economic situation and the fact that they cannot flee to Syria or other parts of Lebanon.

Hizballah understands that the 2006 July war was the last war with Israel that the Shiite community was willing to endure and that the Syria war has exhausted them. Therefore, Hizballah has moved the fight against Israel from the field to speeches and stone statues.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.