Earlier this month, the OPEC countries and Russia failed to reach an agreement to cut production, leading Riyadh to launch an all-out price war with Moscow as both ramp up their drilling. Con Coughlin analyzes some of the geopolitical ramifications:

The primary motivation behind the Saudis’ move is to protect their own share of the global oil market, which is under threat from a combination of softening demand and the renewed strength of the American oil industry. Because the Saudis enjoy low oil-production costs, . . . they are able to cope with lower oil prices, while countries like Russia, which have much higher extraction costs, need global prices to be at least $50 a barrel to make a profit. Thus the Saudi price cut, which saw oil prices fall to around $31 a barrel, will hit the Russian economy hard.

The other important consideration for the Saudis, though, is that, by undermining the strength of the Russian economy, they will force the Kremlin to rethink its ambitions on the world stage, especially its involvement in the Middle East, where Moscow’s main allies are [Riyadh’s greatest foes]: Iran and the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria.

The Saudi calculation now . . . is that with the Russian economy suffering as a result of the oil-price war, the Kremlin will no longer be able to afford costly military interventions in countries such as Syria.

Since Moscow has aligned itself with Israel’s enemies in Syria, Saudi success in the endeavor would bode well for Jerusalem

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.