Last week, an 860-page internal Labor-party document on the problem of anti-Semitism in its ranks was leaked to the press. The report, composed in March, admits that hostility toward Jews is indeed a “problem in the party,” that those in control were too slow to respond to the problem, and that when they did address it they did so poorly. At the same time, it praises the erstwhile Labor leader Jeremy Corbyn—himself one of the worst offenders—for his handling of anti-Semitism from 2018 on. Moreover, the report concludes that the “abnormal intensity of factional opposition . . . inhibited” the party’s ability to deal with the problem; in other words, Corbyn’s opponents, not the anti-Semites, were the real problem. David Hirsh comments:

The report rules out in advance the possibility that anti-Semitism in the Labor party was connected to the politics of the Corbyn faction. It doesn’t even address it. It doesn’t say anything about the way that hostility to “Zionism” became the litmus test of who was inside and who was outside the community of the good. It doesn’t say anything about Stalinist anti-Semitism or about the anti-Semitism of the movement to boycott, divest from, and sanction Israel, or about the Corbyn faction’s record of jumping to the defense of anti-Semites against Jews.

It says that the Corbyn faction tried to expel the anti-Semites, . . . but that its opponents [within the party] sabotaged the procedural moves against the anti-Semites in order to facilitate the “myth” that Corbyn had a political problem of anti-Semitism. [In short], it blames the opponents of Corbyn—the opponents of anti-Semitism—for the anti-Semitism.

[The report’s account] is a classic stab-in-the-back myth. It claims that the reason the Corbyn movement didn’t win in 2017 was because it was betrayed by its enemies within the party. If it had not been stabbed in the back it would have won.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.