Iran Built a Facility to Develop Nuclear Weapons and Hid It from Inspectors during Negotiations with the West

In 2018, the Mossad succeeded in capturing the Islamic Republic’s secret nuclear archive, which experts are still in the process of analyzing and comparing with other sources. One recent discovery is the previously unknown Shahid Mahallati “uranium-metals workshop.” Built in 2002 and operational by 2003, this facility was intended for use as a temporary “pilot plant” to function alongside the main site at Parchin. The latter site, Parchin, was intended to produce enough weapons-grade uranium to build a few nuclear weapons every year. David Albright, Sarah Burkhard, and Frank Pabian describe the purpose of the pilot plant:

Building . . . a production-scale uranium-metallurgy plant is complicated. This plant needs to be capable of making uranium metal, melting it, casting it into molds of necessary shapes, and finishing quality-controlled weapon components. . . . Overcoming these difficulties would typically call for a pilot plant, designed to develop and test critical procedures, . . . starting with surrogate materials [with properties similar to uranium’s], then introducing natural uranium, and later processing weapon-grade uranium.

Since [planners] viewed the pilot plant as temporary, its equipment and personnel would likely be transferred to [Parchin] once the main plant was nearing completion. If [the main plant] failed to become operational by the time the first batch of nuclear explosive material was available, the pilot plant could have served another temporary purpose as well, producing the first weapons-grade uranium core of a nuclear weapon.

Thus Iranian scientists could use Shahid Mahallati to practice the techniques necessary for making the components of a nuclear bomb, without wasting precious uranium. Lest there be any doubt about Tehran’s intentions in building the facility, the documents in the archive describe the creation of a cover story about the plant’s use in order to avoid raising the suspicions of foreign intelligence agencies or overseas suppliers of raw materials.

The pilot plant was shut down by 2011, although its personnel, the research done there, and even some of the equipment and materials were likely transferred to other secret research sites. But even if this were not so, the very fact of Shahid Mahallati’s existence shows that Tehran failed to comply with the 2015 nuclear deal from day one:

As in many other cases, Iran has clearly been dishonest with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). During discussions in September 2015, [conducted pursuant to the deal’s terms], “Iran informed the agency that it had not conducted metallurgical work specifically designed for nuclear devices, and was not willing to discuss any similar activities that did not have such an application.” The activities at Shahid Mahallati and [Parchin] are a dramatic contrast to that statement, activities highlighting once again that Iran furthered its nuclear-weapons capabilities far more than was known prior to Israel’s seizure of the nuclear archive, permitting Iran today to build nuclear weapons faster than previously believed.

Read more at Institute for Science and International Security

More about: Iran, Iran nuclear program, Mossad, U.S. Foreign policy

How Columbia Failed Its Jewish Students

While it is commendable that administrators of several universities finally called upon police to crack down on violent and disruptive anti-Israel protests, the actions they have taken may be insufficient. At Columbia, demonstrators reestablished their encampment on the main quad after it had been cleared by the police, and the university seems reluctant to use force again. The school also decided to hold classes remotely until the end of the semester. Such moves, whatever their merits, do nothing to fix the factors that allowed campuses to become hotbeds of pro-Hamas activism in the first place. The editors of National Review examine how things go to this point:

Since the 10/7 massacre, Columbia’s Jewish students have been forced to endure routine calls for their execution. It shouldn’t have taken the slaughter, rape, and brutalization of Israeli Jews to expose chants like “Globalize the intifada” and “Death to the Zionist state” as calls for violence, but the university refused to intervene on behalf of its besieged students. When an Israeli student was beaten with a stick outside Columbia’s library, it occasioned little soul-searching from faculty. Indeed, it served only as the impetus to establish an “Anti-Semitism Task Force,” which subsequently expressed “serious concerns” about the university’s commitment to enforcing its codes of conduct against anti-Semitic violators.

But little was done. Indeed, as late as last month the school served as host to speakers who praised the 10/7 attacks and even “hijacking airplanes” as “important tactics that the Palestinian resistance have engaged in.”

The school’s lackadaisical approach created a permission structure to menace and harass Jewish students, and that’s what happened. . . . Now is the time finally to do something about this kind of harassment and associated acts of trespass and disorder. Yale did the right thing when police cleared out an encampment [on Monday]. But Columbia remains a daily reminder of what happens when freaks and haters are allowed to impose their will on campus.

Read more at National Review

More about: Anti-Semitism, Columbia University, Israel on campus