Last week, after several failed or aborted attempts, Tehran for the first time put a military satellite into orbit—a feat that involves the same technological capabilities needed to launch an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Moreover, if reports in Iranian media are accurate, the satellite was launched using the same solid fuel that would be necessary for firing an ICBM. This development, write Behnam Ben Taleblu and Bradley Bowman, ought to “set-off alarm bells in Washington.”

A domestically manufactured, multi-stage, solid-propellant satellite-launch vehicle would be a game-changer for Tehran and can make longer-range ballistic missiles possible.

But there is one more reason to worry. Last week’s satellite launch was conducted entirely by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC), which has operational control of Iran’s vast ballistic-missile arsenal. Unlike its predecessors, the new launch vehicle and accompanying satellite did not bear any of the logos of the Iranian Space Agency. Nor did it bear the logos of any of Iran’s defense-ministry subsidiaries. . . . This indicates that production and procurement [took place] entirely outside [of official] government channels.

In short, [it] was part of a secret program now public. Iran’s willingness to place this effort in the hands of the IRGC—designated a terrorist organization by the U.S.—should end any credible assertions that Iran’s interest in space is purely civilian. For too long, the U.S. ignored North Korea’s development of satellite launchers and long-range ballistic missiles. As a result, the Pentagon has been playing catch-up, rushing to field sufficient homeland missile-defense capabilities.

Washington should not make the same mistake when it comes to Iran.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.