Don’t Let Iran Renew Its Quest for Deadly Weapons

Among the many faults of the 2015 nuclear agreement with the Islamic Republic are its sunset clauses, which specify that various restrictions on Iran will expire stepwise, so that by 2030 none will remain. The first to expire is an international ban on the sale of certain conventional weapons to Tehran, which will “sunset” in November of this year. Because the deal was ratified into international law by UN Security Council Resolution 2231, the Security Council has the power to extend the embargo. The State Department now seeks to do just that, explains Benny Avni, but it may face opposition:

Russia, which is eager to renew legal arms sales to Iran, would likely veto the U.S.-proposed resolution—if it ever comes to a vote. China might join, and America’s European allies that cling to the deal would need a lot of convincing before they agree to tweak any part of the 2015 resolution. So [Secretary of State Mike] Pompeo’s attempt to extend the arms embargo could fail, but then America just might get even more bold, using Resolution 2231’s self-destruct mechanism. Known as the “snapback” option, the resolution provided such a path to help the Obama administration sell [the deal] at home.

If Iran were ever to cheat on its obligations, promised top officials in the Obama administration, we’d at any time be able to end the deal and reimpose full sanctions. Further, they added, no one at the UN could stand in our way. Hence the “snapback” mechanism that, according to the UN resolution, allows any of the original parties to the [agreement] to “reimpose unilateral and multilateral nuclear-related sanctions in the event of Iran non-performance,” as Secretary of State John Kerry told the Senate at the time.

Indeed, according to Resolution 2231, the original parties to the nuclear deal—Russia, Communist China, France, Britain, Germany, and America (as well as the European Union and Iran)—can unilaterally launch a process leading to re-imposition of prior strict Security Council sanctions.

Hence, if a new resolution fails, a snapback of all international sanctions must proceed. The 2015 UN resolution had legally bound America to a deal that the Senate wouldn’t endorse. Ending the UN endorsement of the Iran deal would return the power of making such deals to the representatives of the American people. That in and of itself would be grounds for forcing a snapback.

Read more at New York Sun

More about: Barack Obama, Iran, Iran nuclear program, Mike Pompeo, United Nations

What a Strategic Victory in Gaza Can and Can’t Achieve

On Tuesday, the Israeli defense minister Yoav Gallant met in Washington with Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin. Gallant says that he told the former that only “a decisive victory will bring this war to an end.” Shay Shabtai tries to outline what exactly this would entail, arguing that the IDF can and must attain a “strategic” victory, as opposed to merely a tactical or operational one. Yet even after a such a victory Israelis can’t expect to start beating their rifles into plowshares:

Strategic victory is the removal of the enemy’s ability to pose a military threat in the operational arena for many years to come. . . . This means the Israeli military will continue to fight guerrilla and terrorist operatives in the Strip alongside extensive activity by a local civilian government with an effective police force and international and regional economic and civil backing. This should lead in the coming years to the stabilization of the Gaza Strip without Hamas control over it.

In such a scenario, it will be possible to ensure relative quiet for a decade or more. However, it will not be possible to ensure quiet beyond that, since the absence of a fundamental change in the situation on the ground is likely to lead to a long-term erosion of security quiet and the re-creation of challenges to Israel. This is what happened in the West Bank after a decade of relative quiet, and in relatively stable Iraq after the withdrawal of the United States at the end of 2011.

Read more at BESA Center

More about: Gaza War 2023, Hamas, IDF