How an Iranian Airline Brought the Coronavirus to the Middle East

Thus far, the Islamic Republic has been the Middle Eastern country hardest hit by the COVID-19 pandemic. The virus seems to have been carried there directly from China by Iran’s Mahan Air, which, although nominally private, is deeply intertwined with the country’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Moreover, writes Michael Segall, the airline has likely spread the disease to other countries while abetting the ayatollahs’ military ambitions:

On January 31, Iran officially suspended all flights to and from China in order to slow down the spread of the disease. Mahan Air, however, continued flying to and from China, seemingly ignoring the government’s instructions as well as harsh criticism in the local media.

The airline’s involvement in terror and helping to promote the regional and international activity of the Quds Force—the special-operations, terrorism, and subversion arm of the IRGC—were already exposed a decade ago. At that time Mahan Air was blacklisted several times by the U.S. Treasury Department for helping the Quds Force ferry IRGC fighters and advisers, foreign fighters, weapons, and logistical assistance to the different arenas in which Iran meddles, particularly Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen, while also helping to further Iran’s plans to develop weapons of mass destruction.

Mahan Air’s continued flights to China after the flight ban and the Iranian government’s own prohibition on flights were what caused the spread of the coronavirus to several Middle Eastern countries to which the airline kept flying as well. [From] the end of January to mid-March, Mahan Air operated hundreds of flights between Iran and Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, and Syria—countries with a considerable IRGC presence and activity.

The first coronavirus cases in Syria and in Lebanon arrived on Mahan Air flights. Some of the passengers were Shiite pilgrims from Lebanon and Syria who had visited the holy Iranian city of Qom, which was one of the first and main centers of infection, and some were Hizballah and IRGC fighters. . . . In Lebanon the first coronavirus case was reported on February 21. It was a female pilgrim who had returned on Mahan Air’s flight W51152 from a pilgrimage to Qom.

Read more at Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs

More about: China, Coronavirus, Iran, Middle East

What a Strategic Victory in Gaza Can and Can’t Achieve

On Tuesday, the Israeli defense minister Yoav Gallant met in Washington with Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin. Gallant says that he told the former that only “a decisive victory will bring this war to an end.” Shay Shabtai tries to outline what exactly this would entail, arguing that the IDF can and must attain a “strategic” victory, as opposed to merely a tactical or operational one. Yet even after a such a victory Israelis can’t expect to start beating their rifles into plowshares:

Strategic victory is the removal of the enemy’s ability to pose a military threat in the operational arena for many years to come. . . . This means the Israeli military will continue to fight guerrilla and terrorist operatives in the Strip alongside extensive activity by a local civilian government with an effective police force and international and regional economic and civil backing. This should lead in the coming years to the stabilization of the Gaza Strip without Hamas control over it.

In such a scenario, it will be possible to ensure relative quiet for a decade or more. However, it will not be possible to ensure quiet beyond that, since the absence of a fundamental change in the situation on the ground is likely to lead to a long-term erosion of security quiet and the re-creation of challenges to Israel. This is what happened in the West Bank after a decade of relative quiet, and in relatively stable Iraq after the withdrawal of the United States at the end of 2011.

Read more at BESA Center

More about: Gaza War 2023, Hamas, IDF