Since 2013, a major plank of Beijing’s foreign policy has been the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which aims to create a network of highways, railways, fuel pipelines, ports, and improved border crossings that would facilitate trade between China and the rest of Asia and, in turn, connect Asia to Europe and the Horn of Africa. The Middle East, by virtue of its location and its richness in fossil fuels, plays a key role in the initiative. But the COVID-19 epidemic has left many governments wary of entanglement with China, out of concern over both further public-health problems and American pressure. Mordechai Chaziza analyzes the possible consequences:

In the first months of the outbreak, the Middle East rapidly became the second-most hard-hit region after China. Every Middle Eastern country has had confirmed cases. . . . The great fear is that COVID-19 will continue to spread in the Middle East and cause Belt and Road infrastructure projects to come to a halt. Beijing has repatriated citizens working in Iran due to the spread of the virus, a measure it could apply to any severely afflicted BRI host country in the Middle East. Most countries in the region have placed entry restrictions on Chinese citizens or individuals traveling from China. The longer Chinese workers are unable to return to projects overseas, the longer BRI projects will languish, and some may be abandoned altogether.

BRI projects are also predominantly reliant on Chinese rather than local materials and supplies, and the coronavirus outbreak has hampered China’s manufacturing supply chains. . . . These and other disruptions are causing delays, missed deadlines, and increased costs of infrastructure construction—damage local economies will find difficult to absorb. COVID-19 will not be fatal to the implementation of BRI projects, but its fast and lethal spread will cause Middle Eastern governments to rethink the risks attached to ever more integration and economic dependence on China’s infrastructure-based development strategy.

Yet, in the long-term, Beijing could emerge from the crisis with its position improved:

Given China’s economic weight and position in the global supply chain, as well as its status as a leading trading partner for the Middle East and role as the world’s largest oil importer and consumer, Middle Eastern states need China to return to normality as quickly as possible. It is thus hardly surprising that an effect of the coronavirus outbreak has been to foster comradeship and partnership between Beijing and Middle Eastern states as they combat a common enemy.

Once COVID-19 has been brought under control, countries still struggling to rebound from the related economic shocks could use the outbreak as an excuse to abandon unsuccessful or politically unpopular projects with China. Conversely, Beijing may find new opportunities to expand its footprint in countries seeking to foster economic development.

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.