The New U.S. Sanctions on Syria Will Help, Not Harm, Civilians

June 19 2020

In 2014, a Syrian photographer known by the pseudonym Caesar escaped to the West, bringing with him some 55,000 images bearing witness to the Assad regime’s brutal and sadistic treatment of its political opponents. Last year, thanks largely to Caesar’s testimony, Congress enacted sanctions on the Syrian government which went into effect this week. Opponents of these sanctions argue that they will inflict as much pain on Syria’s long-suffering civilians as on its rulers. Nonsense, write David Adesnik and Toby Dershowitz:

[E]xtensive U.S. and European efforts to relieve the suffering of Syrian civilians belie such accusations of cruel indifference. For the duration of the war, they have paired their sanctions with billions of dollars of humanitarian aid every year, which is delivered mainly by the United Nations and its partner nongovernmental organizations.

To mitigate the suffering that persists despite historic levels of aid, what Syria needs is not fewer sanctions but a root-and-branch reform of the UN machinery for delivering aid, which Bashar al-Assad has coopted to the point where UN agencies have become de-facto adjuncts to the siege of civilian populations and other war crimes. Lengthy reports from human-rights advocates, along with a disturbing internal review by UN staff, have documented the UN’s departure from the core humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality, and independence.

For years, the UN has let the Assad regime give direct aid to supportive populations while systematically blocking deliveries to areas outside of its control. Besieging civilian populations is a war crime, yet convoys en route to deliveries in regime-held areas would pass through besieged neighborhoods without aiding their inhabitants. [Another problem is] the World Health Organization’s deference to the regime, which included parroting the Syrian Ministry of Health’s denials of a polio outbreak despite evidence the disease had begun to spread.

Caesar [himself has argued] that sanctions are not about seeking retribution for the crimes of the past but denying Assad the resources to perpetrate new ones. . . . While sanctions alone are not a strategy, they are an integral element of any plausible approach to putting constant pressure on Assad.

Read more at FDD

More about: Bashar al-Assad, Syria, U.S. Foreign policy, United Nations

Israel’s Qatar Dilemma, and How It Can Be Solved

March 26 2025

Small in area and population and rich in natural gas, Qatar plays an outsize role in the Middle East. While its support keeps Hamas in business, it also has vital relations with Israel that are much better than those enjoyed by many other Arab countries. Doha’s relationship with Washington, though more complex, isn’t so different. Yoel Guzansky offers a comprehensive examination of Israel’s Qatar dilemma:

At first glance, Qatar’s foreign policy seems filled with contradictions. Since 1995, it has pursued a strategy of diplomatic hedging—building relationships with multiple, often competing, actors. Qatar’s vast wealth and close ties with the United States have enabled it to maneuver independently on the international stage, maintaining relations with rival factions, including those that are direct adversaries.

Qatar plays an active role in international diplomacy, engaging in conflict mediation in over twenty regions worldwide. While not all of its mediation efforts have been successful, they have helped boost its international prestige, which it considers vital for its survival among larger and more powerful neighbors. Qatar has participated in mediation efforts in Venezuela, Lebanon, Iran, Afghanistan, and other conflict zones, reinforcing its image as a neutral broker.

Israel’s stated objective of removing Hamas from power in Gaza is fundamentally at odds with Qatar’s interest in keeping Hamas as the governing force. In theory, if the Israeli hostages would to be released, Israel could break free from its dependence on Qatari mediation. However, it is likely that even after such a development, Qatar will continue positioning itself as a mediator—particularly in enforcing agreements and shaping Gaza’s reconstruction efforts.

Qatar’s position is strengthened further by its good relations with the U.S. Yet, Guzansky notes, it has weaknesses as well that Israel could exploit:

Qatar is highly sensitive to its global image and prides itself on maintaining a neutral diplomatic posture. If Israel chooses to undermine Qatar’s reputation, it could target specific aspects of Qatari activity that are problematic from an Israeli perspective.

Read more at Institute for National Security Studies

More about: Hamas, Israel diplomacy, Qatar, U.S. Foreign policy