Founded in 1942, the Voice of America (VOA) radio station would, during the cold war, serve as an alternative to Soviet propaganda for people around the world, many of whom lived under totalitarian repression. Earlier this month, the Senate confirmed Michael Pack as the new head for the agency that oversees VOA. Saeed Ghasseminejad and Alireza Nader urge Pack to reform VOA’s Persian-language service:

VOA Persian was once one of the most popular Persian-language broadcasting services in the world, yet fell prey to dysfunctional management and unpopular programming. To return to its position of leadership, the network . . . should commit itself to investigative journalism that exposes the truth behind the Islamist regime’s disinformation campaigns.

The network should also avoid two key mistakes of the past. First, its coverage should not favor the alleged “reformist” faction within the Tehran regime. There are fissures in the regime, but no faction has broken with the militant anti-Western ideology that animates the Islamic Republic. Second, the network should avoid entangling itself in Washington’s partisan debates.

One reason the network’s output doesn’t go viral is that VOA Persian does not provide sufficient and timely coverage of major events such as the mass demonstrations of November 2019 and the brutal crackdown that followed. VOA’s programs have little chance of appealing to Iran’s young and repressed population seeking information and stimulation forbidden by their authoritarian regime.

Instead of favoring the alleged reformists who serve as the Islamic Republic’s loyal opposition, VOA should give voice to a wider spectrum of Iranian opposition activists and human-rights campaigners. This change would help VOA counter the regime’s propaganda and disinformation campaigns. By highlighting the Islamist dictatorship’s corruption, mendacity, and systematic human-rights violations, VOA could fulfill its mission of reporting the truth while undermining regime propaganda that portrays the United States, not the regime itself, as the enemy of the people.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.