Last week, the British musician Richard Cowie, Jr. (known by the stage name Wiley), declared on Twitter that Jews were “cowards” and “snakes,” and made all-too-familiar comments about Jews’ malign power. Twitter, after considerable outcry, removed the offending comments, and temporarily suspended Cowie’s account. But thousands of users of the platform—including the British chief rabbi and various figures from politics, journalism, and entertainment—were dissatisfied with its slow and tepid response, and are currently staging a 48-hour boycott of the website.

The episode raises the persistent problem of how to regulate social media, and the undeniable fact that social-media companies’ own censors rarely respond to anti-Semitic invective and incitement with the alacrity and firmness with which they respond to other forms of bigotry. Nitsana Darshan-Leitner comments:

Social-media platforms enjoy absolute immunity from any liability over the user-generated content they feature. [Instead, they] have an internal mechanism for dealing with “content that violates the community’s rules,” and remove posts according to their sole discretion. The broad immunity afforded to them by law often translates into selective enforcement.

There have been dozens of cases in which right-wing activists and journalists had their Facebook accounts suspended for allegedly violating the community’s rules with their posts, all while someone sitting in Facebook headquarters in Ireland has no problem allowing posts inciting the murder of Jews to stand.

Facebook’s own interpretation of the limits of freedom of expression has had a clear impact on the waves of stabbing and ramming attacks in Israel and around the world. This has been clearly shown in examples of inciting social-media posts included as evidence of motive and intent in many cases of mayhem and murder. The evidence proves that the killers were often inspired by, and drew ideological justification for, their actions from posts by extremist religious leaders. It also proves that they received “training” from videos posted by terrorist groups on their websites as well as on social media.

For years, social-media giants have refused to abide by any regulation or to cooperate with state authorities because they had no intention of sharing the immense power they have amassed in terms of navigating global discourse. That is not only senseless, it violates U.S. laws that bar aiding and abetting any form of terrorism.

Even if the agreement with Hamas to secure the release of some, and possibly all, of the remaining hostages—and the bodies of those no longer alive—is a prudent decision for Israel, it comes at a very high price: potentially leaving Hamas in control of Gaza and the release of vast numbers of Palestinian prisoners, many with blood on their hands. Nadav Shragai reminds us of the history of such agreements:

We cannot forget that the terrorists released in the Jibril deal during the summer of 1985 became the backbone of the first intifada, resulting in the murder of 165 Israelis. Approximately half of the terrorists released following the Oslo Accords joined Palestinian terror groups, with many participating in the second intifada that claimed 1,178 Israeli lives. Those freed in [exchange for Gilad Shalit in 2011] constructed Gaza, the world’s largest terror city, and brought about the October 7 massacre. We must ask ourselves: where will those released in the 2025 hostage deal lead us?

Taking these painful concessions into account Michael Oren argues that they might nonetheless be necessary:

From day one—October 7, 2023—Israel’s twin goals in Gaza were fundamentally irreconcilable. Israel could not, as its leaders pledged, simultaneously destroy Hamas and secure all of the hostages’ release. The terrorists who regarded the hostages as the key to their survival would hardly give them up for less than an Israeli commitment to end—and therefore lose—the war. Israelis, for their part, were torn between those who felt that they could not send their children to the army so long as hostages remained in captivity and those who held that, if Hamas wins, Israel will not have an army at all.

While 33 hostages will be released in the first stage, dozens—alive and dead—will remain in Gaza, prolonging their families’ suffering. The relatives of those killed by the Palestinian terrorists now going free will also be shattered. So, too, will the Israelis who still see soldiers dying in Gaza almost daily while Hamas rocket fire continues. What were all of Israel’s sacrifices for, they will ask. . . .

Perhaps this outcome was unavoidable from the beginning. Perhaps the deal is the only way of reconciling Israel’s mutually exclusive goals of annihilating Hamas and repatriating the hostages. Perhaps, despite Israel’s subsequent military triumph, this is the price for the failures of October 7.