At a virtual meeting of the UN Security Council yesterday, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo urged the council’s members to extend a conventional-arms embargo on the Islamic Republic, set to expire this fall. His words were met with threats to veto any attempt to do so—not just from Russia and China, but from the United Kingdom as well. But what Pompeo failed to do, writes Benny Avni, is to threaten to use the “snapback” clause in the 2015 nuclear agreement, which any party can invoke unilaterally:

Legal eagles at the State Department contend America can trigger [the snapback] mechanism, included in Security Council Resolution 2231, which endorsed [the] nuclear deal. In background briefings, administration officials say America would unilaterally invoke that mechanism, reverting to the international sanctions that existed prior to the 2015 resolution, unless the council acts on the arms embargo before October.

Resolution 2231 removed several prior sanctions painstakingly built up for decades as Tehran continued to acquire nuclear capabilities and act aggressively in the region. Resolution 2231 also contained a series of sunset provisions that gradually ease restrictions further. The first of those, the removal of an arms embargo, is due to expire weeks before our presidential election.

[I]n selling the Iran deal to the American people, officials in President Obama’s administration promised that America could unilaterally reimpose all sanctions at any time it detected Iranian non-compliance. As the UN top political official, Rosemary DiCarlo, told the council Tuesday, Iran violated the arms embargo by smuggling missiles in the region.

Secretary Pompeo urged the Security Council to act without spelling out America’s next step if it doesn’t. At the same time, council members warned America not to do that which Pompeo failed to threaten. . . . Pompeo will be better off making clear that [the White House] has enough muscle left to fend off a dangerous regime.

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.