This summer, London imposed sanctions on dozens of individuals involved in human-rights abuses—marking its first such step since it left the European Union and gained the ability to do so independent of Brussels. Behnam Ben Taleblu urges the British government not to overlook the Islamic Republic in crafting its new trade policies:

Iran, a notorious rights violator subject to increasing pressure from the U.S. Treasury, was absent from the UK’s [sanctions] list. This represents a missed opportunity for the UK, both to signal seriousness to its transatlantic partner about the Iranian threat, as well as to affect the calculations of kleptocrats in Tehran.

The EU has not announced any new missile- or proliferation-related sanctions on Iran since December 2012, and the last terrorism penalties came in January 2019. On the human-rights file, the EU—and by default, the UK—has renewed and occasionally added to a list of sanctioned persons and entities every year since the spring of 2011.

UK officials understand that Iran represents a multifaceted national-security challenge. In 2019, a British tanker was taken hostage by Tehran, and in 2020, pro-Iran militias in Iraq struck a coalition base, killing one British and two American service members. What’s more, Britain has been on the record condemning Iranian missile launches and strikes, and has led the way in international organizations to censure the Islamic Republic for its illicit conventional-arms proliferation.

While sanctions have not been the go-to UK response to these acts of aggression, [London can apply the same justifications for its recent sanctions against other countries] to Iranian acts of domestic suppression. Ample evidence of these abuses exists. . . . The use of sanctions . . . could also serve as a way to cooperate closely with the U.S. in using economic statecraft to address an area of mutual concern.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.