With little fanfare, the Pentagon last week increased the American military presence in northeastern Syria—sending some 100 soldiers and six Bradley fighting vehicles. Jonathan Spyer explains why:

On August 26, four U.S. servicemen were wounded when the vehicle in which they were traveling collided with a Russian military vehicle. The incident took place . . . at the northeastern tip of Syria close to the Tigris River and the border with Iraq. This area lies far east of the Euphrates, and well inside of territory designated as a U.S.-controlled security zone. That is, the Russian presence in the area was itself a provocation. The collision with the U.S. vehicle took place at a time when Russian military helicopters were deployed above the area. It appears to have been deliberately initiated by the Russian force.

This incident reflects a broader pattern. Moscow [believes] that the American presence in eastern Syria lacks a clear strategic [rationale], and hence may be withdrawn if sufficient pressure is applied to it. Moscow wants to see Syria reunited under the rule of President Bashar al-Assad, as a weak and dependent client of Russia. The Kurdish-controlled, U.S.-guaranteed area east of the Euphrates, comprising around 25 percent of the area of Syria, currently stands as a barrier to the achievement of this goal.

The Russians therefore appear to be attempting to whittle away at the American presence, gradually expanding their own area of activities. . . . Parallel to the campaign of harassment, the Russians are seeking, slowly and incrementally, to draw the Kurdish ruling authorities in this area back under their political patronage. . . . The slow-moving contest over the ruins of Syria thus looks set to continue.

In a momentous meeting with the Syrian president Ahmed al-Sharaa in Riyadh, President Trump announced that he is lifting sanctions on the beleaguered and war-torn country. On the one hand, Sharaa is an alumnus of Islamic State and al-Qaeda, who came to power as commander of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which itself began life as al-Qaeda’s Syrian offshoot; he also seems to enjoy the support of Qatar. On the other hand, he overthrew the Assad regime—a feat made possible by the battering Israel delivered to Hizballah—greatly improving Jerusalem’s strategic position, and ending one of the world’s most atrocious and brutal tyrannies. President Trump also announced that he hopes Syria will join the Abraham Accords.

This analysis by Eran Lerman was published a few days ago, and in some respects is already out of date, but more than anything else I’ve read it helps to make sense of Israel’s strategic position vis-à-vis Syria.

Israel’s primary security interest lies in defending against worst-case scenarios, particularly the potential collapse of the Syrian state or its transformation into an actively hostile force backed by a significant Turkish presence (considering that the Turkish military is the second largest in NATO) with all that this would imply. Hence the need to bolster the new buffer zone—not for territorial gain, but as a vital shield and guarantee against dangerous developments. Continued airstrikes aimed at diminishing the residual components of strategic military capabilities inherited from the Assad regime are essential.

At the same time, there is a need to create conditions that would enable those in Damascus who wish to reject the reduction of their once-proud country into a Turkish satrapy. Sharaa’s efforts to establish his legitimacy, including his visit to Paris and outreach to the U.S., other European nations, and key Gulf countries, may generate positive leverage in this regard. Israel’s role is to demonstrate through daily actions the severe costs of acceding to Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s ambitions and accepting Turkish hegemony.

Israel should also assist those in Syria (and beyond: this may have an effect in Lebanon as well) who look to it as a strategic anchor in the region. The Druze in Syria—backed by their brethren in Israel—have openly expressed this expectation, breaking decades of loyalty to the central power in Damascus over their obligation to their kith and kin.