At the end of next week, Washington’s invocation of the “snapback” clause of the 2015 nuclear agreement with Tehran—which allows a single party to reinstitute sanctions on the Islamic Republic if it violates the deal’s terms—will go into effect. But the UN Security Council believes the American move to be illegitimate, since the White House withdrew from the agreement in 2018. Richard Goldberg argues that the U.S. can proceed nonetheless:
Detractors claim that the refusal of most Security Council members to recognize America’s triggering of the snapback leaves the United States more isolated, ignoring widespread support from across the Middle East. These claims dismiss a more fundamental truth: doing nothing would give Iran uncontested international legitimacy in developing its conventional, missile, and nuclear capabilities.
President Trump [should next] announce an executive order threatening the full range of financial sanctions against any firm connected to the transfer of conventional arms, ballistic and cruise missiles, drones, and related components to Iran. Though not covered by the UN embargo, transfers of air-defense systems like the Russian S-400 should be included.
If a Russian or Chinese defense firm tries to sell weapons to Iran, that firm and all the supporting institutions involved in the transaction would face secondary U.S. sanctions. Sanctions would apply not just to new sales but also to maintenance and modernization of existing equipment. Banks, underwriters, shippers, ports, freight forwarders, and other logistics firms would have to choose: involvement in Russian and Chinese military sales or a cutoff from the U.S. financial system and market.
China has gone to great lengths to distance its state-owned energy companies and banks from illicit oil transactions with Iran. Last November, a Russian state-owned nuclear fuel company suspended its work at an Iranian facility after U.S. sanctions were reinstated. Russian and Chinese diplomats can make all the speeches they want; their state-owned enterprises, nonetheless, typically make financially prudent decisions.
In other words, the U.S. doesn’t need Security Council buy-in to make sanctions work.
Read more on Washington Examiner: https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/op-eds/how-trump-can-enforce-the-snapback-of-un-sanctions-on-iran