Iran Is Only Three Months from Being Able to Make a Nuclear Bomb

When the 2015 nuclear deal went into effect, the Islamic Republic was about a year away from being able to produce a single nuclear device. Now Tehran—by serially violating the terms of the agreement—is closer than ever from having the capability to produce not just one, but two, atomic bombs. Yossi Kuperwasser explains:

It is clear that Iran is determined to continue rapidly expanding its capacity to produce nuclear weapons in a short period. The amount of enriched uranium in its possession and the current enrichment capacity already would allow it, if it so wishes, to enrich the uranium to a military level and produce fissile material for two nuclear explosive devices. Whereas a sufficient amount for the first nuclear explosive device can be produced in a little more than three months, within an additional two months Iran would have the required quantity for the production of the second explosive device.

Installing the advanced centrifuges [it is now trying to develop] at the enrichment site could shorten by a few weeks the time required for military-level enrichment.

All this is happening as Iran continues to develop long-range missiles that will allow it to launch nuclear weapons not only against Israel but also against targets in Europe. At the same time, Europe, China, and Russia ignore the U.S. attempts to renew international sanctions against Iran. They are determined to allow the Iranian regime to continue violating the nuclear deal.

It’s worth remembering that Iran’s former president, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, has referred to Israel as a “one-bomb country.”

Read more at Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs

More about: Iran nuclear program, Iran sanctions, Israeli Security, U.S. Foreign policy

 

Yes, Iran Wanted to Hurt Israel

Surveying news websites and social media on Sunday morning, I immediately found some intelligent and well-informed observers arguing that Iran deliberately warned the U.S. of its pending assault on Israel, and calibrated it so that there would be few casualties and minimal destructiveness, thus hoping to avoid major retaliation. In other words, this massive barrage was a face-saving gesture by the ayatollahs. Others disagreed. Brian Carter and Frederick W. Kagan put the issue to rest:

The Iranian April 13 missile-drone attack on Israel was very likely intended to cause significant damage below the threshold that would trigger a massive Israeli response. The attack was designed to succeed, not to fail. The strike package was modeled on those the Russians have used repeatedly against Ukraine to great effect. The attack caused more limited damage than intended likely because the Iranians underestimated the tremendous advantages Israel has in defending against such strikes compared with Ukraine.

But that isn’t to say that Tehran achieved nothing:

The lessons that Iran will draw from this attack will allow it to build more successful strike packages in the future. The attack probably helped Iran identify the relative strengths and weaknesses of the Israeli air-defense system. Iran will likely also share the lessons it learned in this attack with Russia.

Iran’s ability to penetrate Israeli air defenses with even a small number of large ballistic missiles presents serious security concerns for Israel. The only Iranian missiles that got through hit an Israeli military base, limiting the damage, but a future strike in which several ballistic missiles penetrate Israeli air defenses and hit Tel Aviv or Haifa could cause significant civilian casualties and damage to civilian infrastructure, including ports and energy. . . . Israel and its partners should not emerge from this successful defense with any sense of complacency.

Read more at Institute for the Study of War

More about: Iran, Israeli Security, Missiles, War in Ukraine