Last week, a new Jordanian government was sworn in, with Bisher Khasawneh as the new prime minister. Pinḥas Inbari explains the regional implications:

Khasawneh, who was most recently the king’s political adviser, has reportedly held extensive talks with the Saudi crown prince Mohammad bin Salman over the past six months and was scheduled to meet with Abu Dhabi’s crown prince. It was also reported that he has a very close connection to Jared Kushner, President Trump’s Middle East Peace Plan architect, as well as special ties to Egypt’s President Sisi. The implication: the new government could be an integral part of the Trump Peace Initiative. Until now, Jordan was reluctant or even hostile to Trump’s plan and worked to improve its relations with the Palestinian Authority, emphasizing the coordination with the Palestinians on issues related to Jerusalem.

In presenting his government, Prime Minister Khasawneh laid out twelve planks of its platform. The Palestinian issue and the “Hashemite Custodianship of Jerusalem’s Islamic and Christian holy sites” were only the eleventh item. His message was that Jordan now prefers economic programs to “enhance economic resilience and combating poverty and unemployment” over “political activism.”

Such statements suggest that Amman may wish to put aside rivalries with Riyadh regarding authority over the al-Aqsa mosque and the Israel-Palestinian conflict in order to pursue security and economic cooperation with American support. That, in turn, would bode well for Israel.

Noah Rothman provides a worthwhile reminder of why a nuclear Iran is a threat not just to Israel, but to the United States:

For one, Iran is the foremost state sponsor of terrorism on earth. It exports terrorists and arms throughout the region and beyond, and there are no guarantees that it won’t play a similarly reckless game with nuclear material. At minimum, the terrorist elements in Iran’s orbit would be emboldened by Iran’s new nuclear might. Their numbers would surely grow, as would their willingness to court risk.

Iran maintains the largest arsenal of ballistic missiles in the region. It can certainly deliver a warhead to targets inside the Middle East, and it’s fast-tracking the development of space-launch vehicles that can threaten the U.S. mainland. Even if Tehran were a rational actor that could be reliably deterred, an acknowledged Iranian bomb would kick-start a race toward nuclear proliferation in the region. The Saudis, the Turks, the Egyptians, and others would probably be compelled to seek their own nuclear deterrents, leading to an infinitely more complex security environment.

In the meantime, Iran would be able to blackmail the West, allowing it occasionally to choke off the trade and energy exports that transit the Persian Gulf and to engage in far more reckless acts of international terrorism.

As for the possible consequences, Rothman observes:

Iranian retaliation might be measured with the understanding that if it’s not properly calibrated, the U.S. and Israel could begin taking out Iranian command-and-control targets next. If the symbols of the regime begin crumbling, the oppressed Iranian people might find the courage to finish the job. If there’s anything the mullahs fear more than the U.S. military, it’s their own citizens.