Regardless of who wins the upcoming presidential election, writes Ed Husain, a segment of the American left that has made common cause with radical Islam is likely to gain more influence in the Democratic party. This unlikely alliance is exemplified by Rashida Tlaib and Ilhan Omar, who comprise half of the “Squad”—a group of young congresswomen who represent the new face of the Democrats’ left flank.

This intersection has put aside their deep divergences on God, religion, family, homosexuality, and the role of women and united their activist base on campuses and community hubs in their shared hatred for Western history and capitalism. This counterintuitive union, which I have called the “Red-Green Alliance,” is similar to the revolutionary mindset that saw Iranian left-Islamists come together before 1979 with the encouragement of the French philosopher Michel Foucault. In Britain, Jeremy Corbyn, the former Labor party leader, had a similar Red-Green alliance last year with a view to winning the general election with 30 Muslim-influenced constituencies—only to lose disastrously.

But when push comes to shove, Islamism and “wokeness” do not mix. Iran’s Islamists killed thousands and exiled leftists. In Gaza, Hamas hanged leftists from tall buildings. Ask Egyptian feminists how the Islamists in Egypt treated them after the 2011 uprisings. Islamists debated in Parliament to reduce the age of consent for marriage for women from eighteen to nine.

[Moreover], the Red-Green Alliance wants to tear down the alliances of safety and stability that America and the West have supported in the Middle East. Omar has repeatedly attacked Egypt and the Gulf states. Yet the real risks of a Muslim Brotherhood-led, sexist, homophobic, and anti-Semitic government in Libya or Sudan have not seemed to trouble her and her allies.

Yesterday I saw an unconfirmed report that the Biden administration has offered Israel a massive arms deal in exchange for a promise not to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities. Even if the report is incorrect, there is plenty of other evidence that the White House has been trying to dissuade Jerusalem from mounting such an attack. The thinking behind this pressure is hard to fathom, as there is little Israel could do that would better serve American interests in the Middle East than putting some distance between the ayatollahs and nuclear weapons. Aaron MacLean explains why this is so, in the context of a broader discussion of strategic priorities in the Middle East and elsewhere:

If the Iran issue were satisfactorily adjusted in the direction of the American interest, the question of Israel’s security would become more manageable overnight. If a network of American partners enjoyed security against state predation, the proactive suppression of militarily less serious threats like Islamic State would be more easily organized—and indeed, such partners would be less vulnerable to the manipulation of powers external to the region.

[The Biden administration’s] commitment to escalation avoidance has had the odd effect of making the security situation in the region look a great deal as it would if America had actually withdrawn [from the Middle East].

Alternatively, we could project competence by effectively backing our Middle East partners in their competitions against their enemies, who are also our enemies, by ensuring a favorable overall balance of power in the region by means of our partnership network, and by preventing Iran from achieving nuclear status—even if it courts escalation with Iran in the shorter run.