“Anti-racism” has for years been a major tenet of Britain’s Labor party, and especially its left wing, notes Tomiwa Owolade; yet those who most proudly proclaimed themselves anti-racists were often most zealous in defending some of the party’s most prominent figures against charges anti-Semitism. To Owolade, this situation is not so contradictory as it may seem, for the very understanding of racism embraced by the British left—and much of the American—is blind to anti-Semitism, and may even encourage it. He cites the opinions of Ash Sarkar, an influential, young, left-wing British journalist who has proven herself eager to condemn Israel and to dismiss any accusations of anti-Semitism against Laborites:

Sarkar . . . argues that anti-racism is actually about dismantling the material inequalities in our society, and that “racism against Jewish people does not result in the harsher prison sentences, wage gaps, stop and search, or unequal healthcare outcomes that we see with other groups.”

[Hatred of] Jews, by this logic, does not qualify as racism, under this definition which emphasizes “structural inequalities”—that same definition to which Sarkar and many others are most attached. If structural inequalities are the basis for racism, then Jews in contemporary Britain cannot by definition be victims of racism. This concept of racism is not only insensitive to anti-Semitism; it also fails to account for prejudice against other minorities in Britain.

Structural inequalities might be a consequence of race, but this doesn’t necessarily mean that they are. If these outcomes were necessarily because of race, this wouldn’t just mean that minorities with worse outcomes were racially disadvantaged. It would also imply that some minorities, like Jewish people, are racially privileged. (And remember: if you are racially privileged, you can’t be a victim of racism.)

This isn’t simply wrongheaded. In the case of anti-Semitism, it is especially dangerous. As the German social democrat August Babel said, anti-Semitism is the “socialism of the fools.” Jews supposedly possess power and privilege; so to “call them out” thus makes one a foe of structural inequalities.

Ron Ben-Yishai, reporting from a visit to IDF forces in the Gaza Strip, analyzes the state of the fighting, and “the persistent challenge of eradicating an entrenched enemy in a complex urban terrain.”

Hamas, sensing the war’s end, is mounting a final effort to inflict casualties. The IDF now controls 65 percent of Gaza’s territory operationally, with observation, fire dominance, and relative freedom of movement, alongside systematic tunnel destruction. . . . Major P, a reserve company commander, says, “It’s frustrating to hear at home that we’re stagnating. The public doesn’t get that if we stop, Hamas will recover.”

Senior IDF officers cite two reasons for the slow progress: meticulous care to protect hostages, requiring cautious movement and constant intelligence gathering, and avoiding heavy losses, with 22 soldiers killed since June.

Two-and-a-half of Hamas’s five brigades have been dismantled, yet a new hostage deal and IDF withdrawal could allow Hamas to regroup. . . . Hamas is at its lowest military and governing point since its founding, reduced to a fragmented guerrilla force. Yet, without complete disarmament and infrastructure destruction, it could resurge as a threat in years.

At the same time, Ben-Yishai observes, not everything hangs on the IDF:

According to the Southern Command chief Major General Yaron Finkelman, the IDF is close to completing its objectives. In classical military terms, “defeat” means the enemy surrenders—but with a jihadist organization, the benchmark is its ability to operate against Israel.

Despite [the IDF’s] battlefield successes, the broader strategic outcome—especially regarding the hostages—now hinges on decisions from the political leadership. “We’ve done our part,” said a senior officer. “We’ve reached a crossroads where the government must decide where it wants to go—both on the hostage issue and on Gaza’s future.”